F. A. Hayek\u27s Defense of the Market Distribution of Income by Voegeli, William
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 
1981 
F. A. Hayek's Defense of the Market Distribution of Income 
William Voegeli 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Voegeli, William, "F. A. Hayek's Defense of the Market Distribution of Income" (1981). Master's Theses. 
3514. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3514 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1981 William Voegeli 
F.A. HAYEK'S DEFENSE OF THE 
MARKET DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
by 
William J. Voegeli, Jr. 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
December 
1981 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The completion of this thesis is due in large measure 
to the suggestions and encouragement given me by Dr. James 
Wiser, the Chairman of my thesis committee, and by Dr. John 
Williams and Dr. Richard Hartigan, who served as members of 
that committee. Miss Wanda Welch typed the manuscript. My 
wife LOri contributed equal parts of patience and proofreading, 
- both invaluable. 
ii 
VITA 
The author, William John Voegeli, Jr. , was born 
November 21, 1954, in Aurora, Illinois. 
He attended public school in Lombard, ~llinois, and 
graduated from Wheaton North High School in 1972. 
In September, 1972, he entered Illinois State Uni-
versity, and in December, 1975, received the degree of Bachelor 
of Science with a major in Economics. 
In September, 1978, he was granted an assistantship in 
political science at Loyola University of Chicag6. He received 
the Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship for the year 1981-1982. He 
has published "A Critique of the p',ro-Choice Argument" in The 
Review of Politics 43 (October 1981). 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ii 
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
CHAPTER 
I. INEQUALITY AND THE CASE AGAINST 
CAP IT ALI SM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
FREEDOM AND PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
KNOWN LAWS AND AN UNKNOWN ORDER 
WHAT GOVERNMENT MAY DO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
AN ASSESSMENT OF HAYEK 
CAPITALISM AND THE COMMON GOOD . . . . . . . . . . . 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv 
17 
45 
78 
96 
116 
129 
CHAPTER ONE 
INEQUALITY AND THE CASE AGAINST CAPITALISM 
George Gilder begins his book Wealth and Poverty by 
noting the fact that although socialism has fewer friends 
and less persuasive defenses than at any time in this cen-
tury, capitalism has not enjoyed a corresponding increase 
in public esteem. 1 Despite the disenchantment with the 
most readily available alternative, those who practice 
capitalism and those who preach it remain on the defensive. 
It is of little use for the defenders of capitalism to point 
out the staggering productivity of market economies. Marx 
. acknowledged this fact in 1848, ~hen asserted that capital-
ism's dynamism only increased the urgency of going beyond 
•t 2 l. • Nor does the assertion by capitalism's defenders that 
civil liberties have never lasted for long in any society 
. with a centralized economy satisfy the market's critics. 
Arthur Okun acknowledges this claim, but does not regard it 
as decisi~e. 3 
1George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic 
Books, 1981), p. 3. 
~arl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Mani-
festo, in Karl Marx:.Selected Writings, ~d. David McLellan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 224-225. 
\rthur Okun ,: Equality and Efficiency: 'rhe Big Trade-
2!! (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 
38-40. 
1 
2 
What is the source of this continuing rejection of the 
market economy? Though capitalism is a lightening rod for a 
number of resentments, the most significant vulnerability of· 
capitalism, the aspect that elicits both stern intellectual 
critiques and popular resentment, is economic inequality. 
Bertrand de Jouvenel summarizes the situation n._eatly: "High 
living" --owing a yacht, for instance--is considered doubly 
evil by modern moral sensibilities. It is evil in itself, 
ostentatious and decadent. It is even worse that the yacht 
could be sold to alleviate "low living," such as a shortage 
of penicillin for ghetto children. 4 The case against capi-
talism can be presented in many ways; the statistics detail-
. - 5 
ing who gets what lend themselves to innumerable refinements. 
But the moral rejection of inequality is a fundamental fact. 
The efforts by capitalism's defenders to come to grips 
with this fact have not been notably successful. The most 
direct response has been to attack modern egalitarian senti-
ments. If the dist.ribution of wealth under capitalism offend-
ed modern moral sensibilities, the problem was with those 
sensibilities, not capitalism. Social Darwinism stands as 
4 Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 22. 
5 Okun, pp. 68-69. 
3 
the most extreme version of this point of view. In its 
formulation~ the wor~gs of the market economy not only do 
not offend, but perfect_ly embody, the deepest moral impera-
tives. The poor, far from being vi.ctim.s or simply unfortu-
nate,· are fully deserving of their lot. 6 More recent capi-
talist distribution ethics have been less ambitious. Milton 
Friedmants is based on the rights of private property:. "To 
each according to what he and the instruments he owns pro-
duces.n7 Robert Nozickts rule, 11 From each as they [sic] 
choose, to each as they Isic] are chosen,u stresses the para-
mount importance of unfettered exchange. 8 
But the capitalist morality, whether founded on the 
survival of the fittest~ or private property, or free ex-
change~ has not been able to supplant the moral revulsion of 
extreme inequality. Over the last century, defenders of the 
marketcs inequalities have steadily lost ground to those who 
want to limit those inequalities. Child labor laws, social 
. security, progressive income taxes--a.ll reflect this trend. 
More importantly, they reinforce it.. Egalitarians can offer 
6see_Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American 
Thought, revised ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 3-11. 
. 
7Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 161-162. 
8Ro~ert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974), p. 160. 
4 
these long-established correctives as proof that interfering 
with the market's distribution is not runious, contrary to 
conservatives' claims. 9 Since the past remedies have been 
well-received, and since the remaining inequalities still 
grate, further egalitarian policies are called for. Conser-
vative defenders of the market are left in an-untenable 
position. If they advocate discarding th~ welfare state and 
returning to laissez-faire capitalism, they can look forward 
to the political success of a Barry Goldwater or an Alf Lan~. 
don. :_1'But if they accept the premises underlaying the welfare 
state, conservatives implicitly agree to debate the issues of 
political economy in egalitarian terms. So it is difficult 
for defenders of capitalism to influence, much less direct, 
policy without violating the integrity of their principles. 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan have recently per-
formed this balancing act well enough to win high office as 
unabashed advocates of the free market. Yet their victories 
cannot be construed as signs that capitalism is no longer · 
politically vulnerable. If there is a distinctive aspect to 
the opinions of the newly triumphant conservatives, it is an 
emphasis on the inefficiency of the present government 
9
"Conservative" will be used throughout in the modern 
American sense, designating the desire to promote laissez-
faire, unless otherwise noted. 
5 
programs. Promises to ferret out waste and fraud have never 
had wider appeal, as even the most generous taxpayers came 
to sense that the benefits to the poor and to society of an 
~xpensive welfare state are inordinately small. Whether or 
not conservatives can find major superfluities in the govern-
ment remains an open question. But whether they prove to 
be skillful accountants or not, these efforts reveal the 
distinct limitations of the conservatives' mandate. If the 
salient opinion of modern conservatism is that whatever 
government undertakes it should do efficiently, conservatism 
doesn't mean much. Others can make the same claim. Further, 
unless skilled managers are all of the same political party, 
one party's efforts to realize efficiency are likely to be 
as successful as another's. 
So capitalism remains morally and politically pre-
carious. It has an abiding capacity to engender great dis-
parities of wealth and poverty; as long as "to each as he 
is chosen" is the ·rule of distribution, carrying with it the 
near certainty that some will not be chosen at all, we may 
expect these disparities to recur. Nor does the widespread 
aversion to capitalism's inequalities show signs of disap-
pearing. 
Given the continuing popular distaste for drastic 
differences in living standards under capitalism, the problem 
6 
for those who make the egalitarian argument is to frame it 
in such a way as to reveal clearly the connections between 
popular egalitarian sentiments and a program for redistri-
buting income. We now turn to recent reformulations of the 
egal i·tarian argument, both because these arguments themselves 
are challenges to capitalism, and because they are a vehicle 
capable of derailing the nascent revival of capitalism's 
political fortunes. 
The chief problem for egalitarians in liberal demo-
cracies is to explain what it means to be for equality. 
Herbert J. Gans distinguishes the support for more equality 
from that for total equality. The latter, he says, is a 
spurious issue--completely unattainable, and a straw man 
created by the Right to discredit any movement toward greater 
equality. 10 Redistribution is not an end in itself, but a 
means to the realization of a society in which people would 
have.greater power to shape their own lives. As Michael 
. Harrington writes: 
The socialist.aim, at least in its serious formula-
tions, has never been the impossible goal of guar~ 
anteeing everyone the right to win in a competitive 
rat race; it has been to abolish the rat race alto-
gether. The formula, "From each according to.his 
10Herbert J. Gans, More Equality (New York: Random 
House, 1968; Vintage Press, 1974), pp. 66-68. 
7 
ability, to each according to lli.s need_," insists upon_, 
even g1ories in, human differences ..... -inequalities, if 
you will--once they no longer rationalize a system of 
invidious competition. Socialists want to move toward 
equality, in order to transcend it.~l 
Michael Wa1.zer Ls article, "'In Defense of Equality, n 
describes what the attainment and transcending of equality 
- - 12 
might involve. Walzer begins by taking issue with Irving 
Kristol, who attributes the inequalities of the market 
economy to "the tryanny of the bell-shaped curve." Human 
"talents and ablli,tiesn tend to distribute themselves along 
the famous bell-shaped curve, some people having meager 
talents, some a great deal, most people being in-between. 
Income is distributed along a similar curve, and to the ex-
tent that oneLs location in the talent distribution cor-
responds to oneLs spot on the income curve, the system has 
a "rough fairness .. n 13 Some would question how close that 
correspondence really is=' but Walzer makes a more fundamen-
tal complaint .. 
llMichael Harrington, uThe Welfare State and its Neo-
Conservative Critics,u in The New Conservatives: A Critique 
·trom the Left, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New York; 
Quadrangle, 1974), endnot~, p. 322. 
12Michae'l Walzer, "In Defense of Equality," in Coser 
and Howe, pp. 107-123. 
13
rrving Kristol, Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: 
Basic Books_, 1978), p .. 184. 
8 
There is no reason to think that "human talents and 
abilities".in fact distribute themselves along a 
single curve, although income necessarily does. Con-
sider the range and varieties of human capacities: 
intelligence, physical strength, agility and grace, 
artistic creativity, mechanical skill, leadership, 
endurance, memory, psychological insight, the capacity 
for hard work--even moral strength, sensitivity, the 
ability to express compassion.l~ 
Each of these qualities is distributed; no doubt, 
along a bell-shaped curve, but there is no reason to believe 
that any particular one is the key to explaining income dis-
tribution, though some are more closely correlated to that 
curve than others. But Walzer mentions an additional 
quality--the ability to make money. While this talent in-
valves the others, it is not simply the sum of them. Rather, 
money-making is the talent to organize one's other qualities 
in response to economic circumstances. It too is distributed 
along a bell-shaped curve, and it correlates very closely to 
the income distribution curve. (Luck accounts for any dif-
ferences.) Walzer notes that this narrow skill has broad 
--
consequences: .the ability to acquire everything one could 
want •15 
. The problem here is not with money-making, but money 
itself. Insisting that some other quali.ty should be the key 
14 Walzer, p. 109. 
15Ibid~, pp. 109-110. 
9 
to obtaining money would still leave certain people with 
everything and others with nothing, and no talent seems so 
decisive that it should be that consequential. A morally 
superior arrangement would involve allocating particular 
goods to people with corresponding needs, rather than 
allocating all goods on the basis of any narrow skill: 
Consider the case of medical care: surely it 
should not be distributed to individuals because they 
are wealthy, intelligent, or righteous, but only be-
cause they are sick. Now, over any given period of 
time, it may be true that some men and women won't 
require any medical treatment, a very large number 
will have to have_some moderate degree of attention, 
and a few will have to have intensive care. If that 
is so, then we must hope for the appearance of another 
bell-shaped cure. Not just any bell will. do. It must 
be the right one, echoing what might be called the 
susceptibility-to-sickness curve.l6 
Egalitarianism, says Walzer, is natural in the sense 
that it desires that social goods should go where they are 
needed and appreciated--sick people should get doctors, music 
lovers music, naturalists open space, etc. He calls this 
approach "the doctrine of right reasons." Distribution based 
solely on money-making, intelligence, beauty, or any other 
one thing,. is perverse because it allocates on the basis o~ 
wrong reasons. "What socialists want is a society in which 
wealth is no longer convertible into social goods with which 
16Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
10 
it has no intrinsic connection. 17 Since it is in the nature 
of money to be convertible outside its sphere, any attempt to 
implement the doctrine of right reasons, such as national 
health insurance, will be subverted by the tyranny of money. 
(The possessors of money will be able to buy health care 
beyond their ne6ds, straining the resources of the system that 
delivers it to the truly needy.) Therefore, money itself must 
be distributed "more or less equally" to protect "legitimate 
distribution processes."18 
Walzer's is hardly the last word on the subject of 
economic equality, but it is a, ·compelling alnd fresh statement 
of the Left's position. According to Milton Fri~dman, one of 
capitalism's most prominent defenders, "In some intellectual 
circles the desirability of equal:i ty of outcome has become an 
article of religious faith: everyone should finish the race 
at the same time."19 But Walzer, presumably a member of the 
intellectual circles Friedman has in mind, seems very undoc-
trinaire in his willingness to argue his case down to the 
most basic premises. If Walzer's thoughtfulness were unique, 
perhaps Friedman's charge could be sustained. But this does 
17Ibid., p. 116. 
18Ibid., pp. 112-117. 
19Milton and.Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979), p. 134. -
11 
not appear to be the case. David Spitz makes a point similar 
to Walzer's: Equality as a moral principle does not require 
the elimination of diff~rences among men, but the justifica-
tion of those differences in terms of the truly necessary and 
just.· Spitz calls this "Equality of consideration." It puts 
the burden of proof on the defenders of inequalities, rather 
than the egalitarians. 20 R.H. Tawney stressed the same point 
fifty years ago: 
While [men] differ profoundly as individuals in capa-
city and character, they are equally entitled as 
human beings to consideration and respect, ••• The well-
being of a society is likely to be increased if it so 
plans its organization that, whether their powers are 
great or small, all its members may be equally e~ibled 
to make the best of such powers as they possess. 
So, while there may be egalitarians who blindly embrace 
certain doctrines, everi as there are unreflective adherents of 
every faith, the suggestion that egalitarianism itself is 
characteristically and thoroughly dogmatic seems unwarranted. 
Nor does the conservative effort to dismiss the egalitarian 
argument as the re·sul t of a major misunderstanding between 
equality of opportunity and equality of result stand up. 22 
20na~id Spitz, "A Grammar of Equality," in Coser and 
Howe, pp. 148-149. 
21R.H. Tawney, Equality (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
1931)' p. 34. 
22Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 132. 
12 
In the first place, to say egalitarians wants total equality 
of results is a straw man, as already noted. In the second 
place, the reasons why_egalitarians desire greater equality 
are not going to be met by equal opportunity. Removing arti-
ficial barriers to wealth does nothing but assure the oppor-
tunity for narrow talents to command the broadest'range of 
goods. The doctrine of right reasons can hardly be satisfied 
simply by eliminating the worst reasons for allocating wealth, 
such as skin color. Christopher Jencks points out that in a 
certain sense, America has already achieved equality of oppor-
tunity. His studies have shown that the degree of income 
inequality between two adult brothers is likely to be the same 
as between any two men chosen at random. Since no program can 
reasonably hope to provide more equality of opportunity to 
children at large than what is provided children of the same 
family, it would appear that if reduction of economic in-
equality is truly a social good, we will have to pursue it 
directly, not through the mediate goal of equalizing oppor-
t •t 23 un~ y. 
Furthermore, equality of opportunity is not a satis--
factory substitute for the attainment of greater economic 
equality, because it is not clear to what extent the one is 
23
christopher Jencks et al, Inequality: A Reassess-
ment of th~ Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New 
York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 7-8. 
13 
different from the other. If the true meaning of equal oppor-
tunity is the removal of conventions that impede certain 
groups, then equal opportunity can be effectively severed 
from economic egalitarianism. But if equality of opportunity 
does not merely negate artificial barriers to advancement, 
but positively secures the factual prerequisites by which 
individuals may use all their natural abilities, the task of 
equalizing opportunity is subsumed to a large degree by the 
reduction of economic inequality. 24 Even the guarantee of 
equal access to such essential determinants of a life's course 
as nutrition, health care, and education, may not fully 
equalize opportunity. Natural inequalities are "cummulative 
and self-reinforcing;" the gains and the losses of the father 
are visited on the son. 25 If accidents of birth are not to 
resurface as a source of inequality, equalizing opportunity 
is not something a society can do just once, but will be an 
ongoing effort virtually indistinguishable from the enactment 
26 
of the egalitarian agenda. 
24 
. Tawney, p. 125. 
25spitz, pp. 132-133. 
26
see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 65-90. 
14 
Finally, the Left insists that the most radical 
inequality of opportunity is to be found in the self-rein-
forcing concentration of power and wealth in modern capitalis-
tic societies. Unequal opportunity is not some appendage to 
capitalism, but intrinsic to a system where the insular rul-
ing class uses power to secure its wealth andwealth to secure 
its power. 27 Equality of opportunity could be an attribute of 
a market economy consisting of shopowners.and craftsmen. But 
it is incompatible with the logic of corporate capitalism 
where millions of lives are altered by the decisions of a very 
few people. 
To repeat, economic inequality is the chief source of 
capitalism's vulnerability. The widespread disaffection for 
the contract between indecent high living and indecent low liv-
ing is the material cause. But, as we have seen, a more 
sophisticated critique of the free market continues, and its 
fashioners await the chance to shape popular resentment into 
a politically consequential force. Whether the egalitarian 
brief against capitalism is sound or not, it is deserving of 
serious attention, both :(or its political implications and-
its capacity to perpetuate capitalism's defensive posture as 
a morally illegitimate system. 
27 . Tawney, _pp. 71-72 
15 
It receives such attention in the writings of Fried-
riech A. von Hayek. Though an economist by profession, whose 
pursuit of this caree~_resulted in a Nobel prize in 1974, and 
who has insisted he attaches greater importance to his , ; 
28 . 
economic work than any other, Hayek has developed a defense 
of capitalism over the past thirty-five years. This defense 
is not primarily that of an economist but of a political 
theorist. Hayek's argument on behalf of the market economy 
rests on a theory of the proper role of government, the true 
nature of law, and on society's capacity to order itself 
spontaneously. Hayek is widely acknowledged as one of the 
-
most compelling defenders of the free market. His political 
works have greatly increased the rhetorical vocabulary of 
capitalism's advocates, and been :enthusiastically received 
by them. 29 
Hayek has given lengthy, careful attention to the 
egalitarian indictment of capitalism, and clearly considers 
it to be an issue of great importance. If we carefully 
examine Hayek's defense of capitalism, with special emphasis 
on his treatment of capitalism's distribution of wealth, we 
. 
28Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road 'l'o Serfdom (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1944), -p. x. 
29George C. Roche III, "The Rele~ance of Friedrich A. 
Hayek," in Essays on Hayek, ed. Fritz Machlup, with a fore-
. word by Milton Friedman (New York: New York University Press, 
1976), pp. 10-11. 
16 
will be in a better position to assess the degree to which 
capitalism is discredited by egalitarian arguments and 
sentiments. This examination of Hayek's defense of the mar-
ket will contribute ultimately to an understanding of the 
market's defensibility. We will first consider such key 
concepts in Hayek's argument as freedom, progress, law, order, 
and government's proper role, examining how they contribute 
to Hayek's rebuttal of egalitarianism. Then we will consider 
the implications of Hayek's arguments in terms of social co-
hesion and moral order, to see if, in the attempt to refute 
the egalitarian critique, Hayek has adopted otherwise dubious 
positions. ·.Finally, this thesis will review the debate over 
capitalism's distribution processes in light of Hayek's con-
tribution. 
CHAPTER TWO 
FREEDOM AND PROGRESS 
Friedrich Hayek's defense of the m~trket economy's 
distribution of income starts from the sober acknowledgment 
that that distribution does indeed offend modern notions of 
decency. By declining to pursue the tempting but unsatis-
factory course of insisting that people must somehow adjust 
their consciences to modern realities, Hayek prepares to 
enter the issue of incomE! distribution at the truly central 
point. Hayek even admits that his own sense of justice is 
not entirely comfortable with all of capitalism's results: 
.The results of ••• remuneration according to 
the value of the product m;ust appear as highly unjust 
from the point of view of distributive justice. It 
will rarely correspond to what we regard as the sub-
. jective merit of a performance. That the speculator 
. who by chance has guessed correctly may earn a fortune 
in a few hours while the life-long efforts of an in-
ventor who has been anticipated by another by a few 
days remains [sic] unremunerated, or that the hard 
work of the peasant who clings to his soil barely 
brings him enough to.keep going, while a man who en-
. joys writing detective stories thereby earns enough to 
afford a luxurious life, will appear unjust to most 
people. I understand the dissatisfaction produced by 
the daily observation of such cases and honour the 
feeling which calls for distributive justice.· If it 
were a question of whether fate or some omnipotent and 
omniscient power should reward people according to the 
~---· ---~ -· ---
17 
18 
principles of commutative or according to the princi-
ples of distributive justice, .we should probably all 
choose the latter.30 
Except for the (characteristically) dispassionate 
language, one might suppose the foregoing to be a passage from 
an indictment of capitalism for its endemic injustice. We get 
the first hint of how Hayek plans to dissociate himself from 
egalitarianism when he makes his approval of distributive jus-
tice conditional upon distribution by "fate or some omnipotent 
and omniscient power." In fact, there are no such powers, 
says Hayek, and the entire egalitarian argument is based on 
the premise that we can do something about the distribution 
of income, rather than accepting it as fated. By this caveat, 
Hayek indicates that he will insist on comparing the market to 
real alternatives, not to ideal ones that might tacitly pre-
suppose omniscience for their operation. The course of Hayek's 
argument will be to insist that despite the defects of its 
income distribution, the market is, on balance, superior to 
. . 
the available alternatives, correctly perceived. Capitalism 
is desirable for Hayek, as democracy was desirable for Winston 
Churchill, largely becaus~ the alternatives are all inferior. 
To analyze Hayek's argument, then, is to discern Hayek's 
characterization of capitalism and his view of the alterna-
tives to capitalism, and to see why he prefers the former. 
30 F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 257. 
19 
The ultimate concern of Hayek's political philosophy, 
towards which everything else in it is directed, is progress. 
Progress, he feels, is_the essence of civilization; sometimes 
he uses the two words almost interchangeably. "The preserva-
tion of the kind of civilization that we know depends on the 
operation of forces which, under favorable conditions, pro-
31 duce progress." According to C.S. Lewis~ "Progress means 
getting nearer to the place where you want to be."32 Hayek's 
notion of progres·s is emphatically different, lacking any 
teleological imperative. It is by "living in and for the 
future [that] human intelligence proves itself. Progress is 
movement for movement's sake ••• 33 
Hayek's view of progress rests on two premises. First, 
individuals have an infinite array of desires and interests. 
Any attempt to speak of a society progressing involves the 
reduction of the goals of each member of society to some 
broad general desires. Hayek feels this consolidation is un-
warranted. Individuals' goals have a concreteness that makes 
. 
31~,.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 39-40. 
32c.s. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 
1943; Macmillan Paperbacks, 1960), p. 36 • 
. 33 
Hayek, Constitution, p. 41. 
20 
movement towards them meaningful, while talk of "society's 
goals" is always hopelessly amorphous. 34 Hayek complains 
that this particulari~tic emphasis on what individuals want 
ia interpreted, often and wrongly, as an endorsement of 
crass selfishness. Hayek insists that he does not profess 
any sort of egoism. Emphatically included irr the goals 
individuals will want to pursue are the altruistic or chari-
table, which do not benefit them except by the satisfaction 
they derive from helping others. 35 
The second premise of Hayek's understanding of pro-
gress is that each individual knows more about what he wants 
and dislikes, what he can and cannot do, than anyone else. 
Hayek refers to this phenomenon as the "division of know-
ledge," and considers it as least as important to the under-
standing of social processes as the far more famous division 
of labor. The problem of the division of knowledge, from 
the point of view of a social scientists, is to find out how 
millions of people can interact in a complex society when 
each one of· them only knows a little bit about the desires of 
of others, the possibilities open to him, the chances of a. 
34 Ibid., p. 40 and note 4, p. 429. 
35Ibid., pp. 78-80 
21 
36 
venture's success, etc. From the perspective of the 
legislator, who wants to formulate beneficial government 
policies, the division of knowledge constitutes a boundary 
to what the government is able to do or what it needs to do. 
Policies that presuppose gathering and digesting comprehen-
sive data about the functioning of society are definitely 
suspect. Such efforts will never come near "the knowledge 
of particular circumstances of"time and place," possessed 
by each individual. Such knowledge is terribly useful and 
greatly diffused. Everyone has a body of knowledge which 
no other person possesses entirely, so everyone is able to 
make unique contributions and calculations. 37 This disper-
sion of knowledge is crucial to Hayek's point of view: 
It is impossible for any man to survey more than a 
limited field, to be aware of the urgency of more 
than a limited number of needs •••• This is the 
fundamental fact on which the whole philosophS of 
individualism [Hayek's philosophy] is based.3 
Hayek's stress on the division of knowledge gives his 
treatment of liberty a unique coloring. According to Hayek: 
36F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 50. 
37Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
38Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 59. 
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The case for individual liberty rests chiefly on the 
recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all of us 
concerning a great many of the factors on which the 
achievement of our ends and welfare depends. • • • If 
there were omniscient men, if we could know not only 
all that affects-the attainment of our present wishes 
but also our future wants and desires, there would be 
little case for liberty.39 
By asserting that liberty has little intrinsic importance, 
Hayek takes a different approach than other defenders of 
capitalism. Milton Friedman, for example, calls freedom the 
40 
"ultimate goal in judging social arrangements." Some stu-
dents of Hayek have failed to note his pragmatic approach to 
liberty, and treated him as a classical liberal whose views 
are the same as Friedman's. 41 This error may be attributable 
to the fact that Hayek's writings often appeal to an assumed 
concern for liberty; his first and most famous book, The Road 
to Serfdom, did not try to argue 'that Hitler was evil because 
he had stifled progress--Hayek proceeded on the understanding 
that Naziism was repugnant to his audience. Nonetheless, 
. when Hayek speaks directly of freedom, he always stresses its 
role in furthering progress. 
39Hayek, Constitution, p. 29. 
4
°Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p. 12. 
41 . . . See Gottfried Dietze, "Hayek on the Rule of Law," in 
Machlup, p. 114 •. See also .Morris M. Wilhelm, "The Political 
Thought of Friedrich A. Hayek," Political Studies 20 (June 
1972): 169. 
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But how does freedom facilitate progress? The answer, 
in brief, is that it transforms the division of knowledge 
from a cause of chaos -~n a large society to a source of order • 
. If we tried to organize society from.the center, the sheer 
volume of things we could not know, changes we could not 
anticipate, would frustrate us at every turn.- By allowing in-
dividuals to pursue various enterprises, based on their own 
assessments of the prospects for these efforts, we remove the 
necessity for centralized direction of society. As Hayek says: 
We want the individual to have liberty because only if 
he can decide what to do can he also use all his unique 
combination of information, skills and capacities which 
nobody else can fully appreciate. To enable the indi-
vidual to fulfil his own potential we must also allow 
him to act on his own estimates of the various chances 
and probabilities. Since. we do not know what he knows, 
. we cannot decide whether his decisions were justified; 
nor can we know whether his success or failure was due 
to his efforts and foresight, or to good luck.42 
By liberty, Hayek refers to "that condition in which 
coercion of some by others is reduced to a minimum."43 
·Coercion, in turn, is "such control of the environment of a per-
son by another that, in order to avoid a greater evil, he is 
forced to act, not according to a coherent plan of his own but 
t ' h 44 o serve the ends of anot er." Does this mean that if my 
42 Hayek, Studies, p. 233 • 
. 43 Hayek, Constitution, p. 11. 
44Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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employer will not give me the raise I desire, forcing me to 
abandon the coherent plan I had to buy a new car, that he 
has coerced me and dep!ived me of my freedom? No, says 
.Hayek. He elaborates his definition, saying that liberty 
culminates in the assurance of a sphere of unfettered action 
wherein each citizen is immune to interference by others. 
An indispensible part of that sphere is the right to own 
45 private property and dispose of it as one chooses. A 
tight-fisted empl~yer does not transgress my sphere, does 
not coerce me, as a thief certainly does. Moreover, while 
the employer may force me to make the unpleasant choice to 
find other employment, this is not comparable to acting on 
pain of injury or death. 46 Finally, according to Hayek, 
liberty does not mean the ability to do whatever one desires. 
The fact of coercion cannot be equated with circumstances of 
limited funds, talents, or resources, though both may pre-
vent the realization of some personal goa1. 47 
A state. devoid of coercion would be the ideal, but 
because of man's demonstrated propensity to act against 
others, the realistic goal calls for minimizing coercion, 
not eliminating it. Minimizing coercion requires th·e 
45Ibid., pp. 137-143. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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existence of a government which possesses coercive powers 
itself, and uses them to dissuade individuals bent on trans-
gressing the protected_sphere of others. If this government 
·is to diminish rather than exacerbate the problem of coercion, 
the scope of its powers must be clearly limited. "The limi-
tation of all coercion to the enforcement of-general rules 
of just conduct was the fundamental principle of classical 
liberalism, or, I would almost say, its definition of 
liberty."48 (Hayek considers his own views consonant with 
those of classical liberalism.) The "general rules of just 
conduct" will be considered in the discussion of Hayek's 
philosophy of law in Chapter Three. In Chapter Four we will 
study the nature of the limitations Hayek would place on 
government. For the time being, we will regard Hayek's 
notion of a free society as being similar to the nightwatch-
man state. In such a society each citizen has legal status 
as a protected member of the community, immunity from arbi-
trary arrest, the· right to work at whatever he decides to do, 
the right to movement as he chooses, and the right to own 
property. 49 
48F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, 
Economics, and the History of Ideas (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 109. 
49 Hayek, Constitution, p. 20. 
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The leading characteristic of a free society that 
makes the division of knowledge a source of social order 
rather than an obstacl~ to it is the price system in a com-
petitive market economy. The price system reflects how much 
people want things and how easily they are acquired. Know-
ledge of the price of a good or service obviates the need 
for trying to find out who wants what, where it can be 
50 
obtained, how it can be delivered; and so.on. Adam Smith 
announced that the division of labor was the chief cause of 
the wealth of nations. 51 But Hayek feels the Smith's 
venerable pin factory example misleadingly suggests that the 
most important division of labor goes on within ·a single 
firm, when in fact the division of labor among firms is the 
' 
real source of prosperity. The passage to modern society is 
the story of prices rather than rules coming to direct pro-
ductive activities. As this change took place, says Hayek, 
societies grew more prosperous. Everyone in society, not 
just the rulers, was able to ascertain and act upon the facts 
that might produce wealth, so it was pursued more energet-
ically and more flexibly. It became worthwhile to specialize 
50 Hayek, Individualism, pp. 85-86. 
51Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Canaan, with an Introduction 
by Max Lerner (New York: Modern Library, 1937), pp. 3-12. 
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in the production of certain goods, concentrating on gaining 
knowledge about the demand for these things and the way to 
supply them. The gene~al prosperity, he concludes, is a 
result of the greatly increased opportunities individuals 
h . t h" . f" . 1 52 ave · o ac 1eve 1nanc1a success. 
The price system is the leading example of the capa-
city of a society to spontaneously order itself. A small 
group, such as a tribe or a village, is simple enough that 
most of the social processes can be directed by a central 
authority. But the expansion of the scope of civilization 
to include profitable interaction among a larger number of 
people required that this authority be superseded. Hayek 
thinks that the initial desire to limit government can be 
traced to the simple desire to reduce the chances of being 
bullied or coerced. But the discovery that a diminution of 
government set loose forces that spontaneously generated a 
desirable social order was the beginning of the modern 
attachment to liberty. 53 The very idea of social, as opposed 
to tribal, order carries with it the process of reconciling 
diverse wants and knowledge. ' In a social order, Hayek says: 
52 Hayek, New Studies, pp. 62-63. 
53 Hayek, Studies, pp. 161-162. 
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Individuals are able, on the basis of their own 
respective peculiar knowledge, to form expectations 
concerning the conduct of others, which are proved 
correct by making possible a successful mutual ad-
justment of the actions of these individuals.54 
Though Hayek is conspicuous among contemporary 
political theorists in extolling the spontaneous order, he 
regards himself as being only a disciple of the 18th century 
philosophers, such as Mandeville, Hume, Josiah Tucker, 
Montesquieu, Adam Ferguson, and Smith, who reacted against 
the "constructive rationalism" associated with Cartesian 
philosophy by emphasizing the degree to which society could 
spontaneously order itself. Smith's "invisible hand" may 
have been an excessive claim that the spontaneously generated 
order was always the best possible. But, Hayek says, Smith 
was like all the others in seeing that society progressed 
when "less effective" institutions or practices were dis-
placed by those more effective at the "reconciliation of di-
. 55 
verse interests." Bernard de Mandeville was not the most 
penetrating of these thinkers, but he was the first to grasp 
the key insight: 
His main contention became simply that in the complex 
order of society the results of men's actions were -
very different from what they had intended, and that 
the individuals, in pursuing their own ends, whether 
54 Hayek, New Studies, p. 9. (Italics mine.) 
55 Hayek, Studies, pp. 99-101. 
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selfish or altruistic, produced useful results for 
others which they did not anticipate or perhaps even 
know;_and finally that the whole order of society, 
and even all that we call culture, was the result of 
individual strivings which had no such end in view, 
but were channeled to serve such ends by institutions, 
practices, and rules which also had never been 
deliberately invented but had grown up by the survival 
of what proved successful.56 
-
The price system is a noteworthy example of society's 
capacity to order itself spontaneously, but it is not the 
only one. The existence and growth of language is an even 
more profound demonstration of man's capacity to create use-
ful means of mutual accommodation without any pre-existing 
master plan. 57 Hayek offers language and the price system as 
proof of the excessive rigidity of the dichotomy between 
nature and convention that he traces back to the ancient 
58 Greeks. Hayek claims that David Hume outlined a middle 
category to be applied to spontaneous developments such as 
the price system or language, that were neither instinctive 
nor contrived. These social phenomena were the results of 
human action but not of human design, and as such should be 
56 Hayek, New Studies, p. 253. 
57Hayek,- Studies, p. 72. 
58 Hayek, New Studies, pp. 4-6. See also Hayek, Stud-
~' pp. 96-98, and Joseph Cropsey, "Conservatism and Libera-
lism," in Left, Right, and Center, ed. Robert A Goldwin 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 44. 
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accorded a quasi-natural status, and not derided as arbitrary 
arrangements subject to change whenever we might like. 59 
The spontaneous ,order makes government intervention in 
the economy to achieve the production and distribution of 
goods unnecessary. The more telling assertion is the govern-
ment intervention in the spontaneous order is-positively harm-
ful. Hayek writes: 
The reason why ••• isolated commands requiring speci-
fic actions by members of the spontaneous order can 
never improve but must disrupt that order is that they 
will refer to a part of a system of interdependent 
actions determined by information and guided by pur-
poses known only to the several acting persons but not 
to the directing authority. The spontaneous order 
arises from each element balancing all the various 
factors operating on it and by adjusting all its vari-
ous actions to each other, a balance which will be 
destroyed if some of the actions are determined by 
another agency on the basis of different knowledge and 
in the service of different ends.60 
Where societies are spontaneously. ordered, the intrusion of 
centralized commands upon them does not solidify order, but 
creates uncertainty and confusion. People try to adjust to 
the new set of circumstances without knowing if they are 
permanent or temporary, or whether or not more central orders 
will follow. 61 
59 Hayek, New Studies, pp. 4-6. 
· 
6
°F.A. Hayek, Law Legislation, and Liberty, 3 vols. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), vol. 1: Rules 
and Order, p. 51. 
· 
61Hayek, Constitution, pp. 150-161. 
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But the production and consumption of goods and ser-
vices is not the only aspect of social life that orders 
itself spontaneously. '-In the longer run, the very existence 
of society depends upon the spontaneous emergence of needed 
values and institutions. While Hayek denies that a society 
-
as such can progress, since it is not an entity that can 
have goals, in the process of changing to meet the changing 
desires of its members, a society--that is, the whole array 
of regularities that constitutes the public life of a 
society--will evolve. This evolution is the most important 
instance of the coordination of individual and social order-
liness; individual desires elicit complementary actions by 
others, and those actions that do the best job of satisfying 
the wants come to characterize the social order. Whether or 
not particular aspects of a social order persist depends on 
their contribution to the vitality of the group. When cer-
tain values or institutions are in conflict at the margin, 
the people of the' society must gravitate towards one or the 
other. Those practices that contribute to the long-term 
continuity and growth of a social order will become more 
common, while groups that choose practices unconducive to 
such continuity will disappear, taking their distinctive 
social characteristics with them. 62 
62 Hayek, Studies, p. 77. See also Hayek, New Studies, 
PP. 19-20. 
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Hayek is at pains to deny that his ideas of social 
evolution resemble what he regards as the excesses of Social 
Darwi.nism. Hayek • s co1~cern is with the evolution of a 
.ci~ilization •s customs and institutions. 63 According to 
Hayek, Social Darwinism erred by concentrating on the natural 
selection of individuals, and on innate rather than acquired 
h t . t• 64 c arac er1.s 1.cs. Hayek says that culture evolves as unsuc-
cessful groups immitate successful ones, or are assimilated 
65 by them. So subtle is this process that it is not even 
necessary that the qualities that cause a particular group 
to thrive be known to its members, new or old. Without in-
tending to, they will embrace these practices in· the process 
of socialization. (Hayek's most important book, The Consti-
tution of Liberty, is dedicated t~ "the unknown civilization 
that is growing in America.") 
From a foundation that incorporates the intrinsic 
desirability of progress, the ineluctable division of know-
ledge, and the necessity of freedom for making the latter 
spontaneously generate the former,.Hayek proceeds to dispute 
the egalitarian indictment of the market. He will do so by.· 
63Hayek, New Studies, pp. 67-68. 
64 Hayek~ Rules and Order, p. 23. 
65Ibid., note 7, p. 169. 
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insisting that the groups for whom the Left is especially 
solicitous--the poor and the working classes--are better 
off under the market than they are after the reforms proposed 
by its critics. The restrictions on the market cause a loss 
in economic vitality that affects the entire society, includ-
ing the poor, adversely. They also distort values, encourag-
ing beliefs and practices that are harmful to the whole 
society, including, and perhaps especially, the poor. As 
Hayek states: 
Men can be allowed to act on their own knowledge and 
for their own purposes only if the reward they obtain 
is dependent in part on circumstances which they can 
neither control nor forsee. And if they are to be 
allowed to be guided in their actions by their own 
moral beliefs, it cannot also be required that the 
aggregate effects of their respective actions on the 
different people should correspond to some ideal of 
distributive justice. In this sense freedom is in-
separable from rewards which often have no connection 
with merit and are therefore felt to be unjust.66 
Hayek stresses that rearranging the results of the 
market economy on behalf of the poor is likely to prove harm-
ful to them in the long run. He goes so far as to say that 
the main benefits of freedom are not in exercising it, but 
in living in a society w~ere freedom constantly engenders 
progress in ways that could not have been forseen or·planned. 67 
· 
66F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 2: 
· The Mirage of Social Justice, p. 120. 
· 
67Hayek, _fonstitution, pp. 31-32. 
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For example, an affluent class is able to experiment with 
new forms of living and consumption which may "catch on;" if 
so, new sectors of the __ economy will emerge, providing new 
jobs, and products once considered luxuries, like cars and 
televisions, will become ubiquitous. Conversely, says Hayek, 
if the advances now pioneered by the affluen~were, as a 
matter of policy withheld until they were universally avail-
able, most would never be realized at a11. 68 Progress re~ 
quires ample scope for the exploration of the odd but intri-
guing possibilities, for serendipity, for following hunches, 
and no comprehensive government program can allow these 
things the latitude to be found among free men pursuing 
private visions. According to Hayek, redistribution may make 
the poor better off in the short run, but the long-term con-
sequences of stifling the creativity of the more affluent 
. 69 
classes limits the chances the poor have of escaping poverty. 
The prerequisite for any distribution is a vibrant economy, 
but this requi~es entrepreneurs who will endure great risks, 
and who will come forth only if they might achieve great 
rewards. Confiscate such rewards and there will be less risk-
. . 70 
taking and fewer breakthroughs in new goods and serv~ces. 
68 . 42-44 Ib1d., pp. 
69Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
70 New Studies, 64-65. Hayek, pp. 
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In the market things are produced by those who can 
do so-cheaply, since the incentives to take markets away 
from expensive producers are strong. In many cases the 
results of the market's operation are unsatisfactory and we 
feel that simple changes could correct the situation. But 
such efforts reveal that it is extremely difficult for the 
government to do just one thing. The political and admini-
strative logic of the situation· draws the government into a 
broad-ranging and protracted effort, that may result in one 
thing being done better than it would have been done by the 
market, and a thousand things being done worse. 71 For ex-
ample, rent control, public housing, and slum clearance are 
all activities that begin with modest and laudable aims, but 
which, once begun, are almost i~possible to stop or con-
tain because of the political expectations they engender. 
· Rent control continues long after a housing crisis is over, 
and public housing and slum clearance involve many more 
beneficiaries than originally planned, including many who 
are economically self-sufficient but politically powerfu1. 72 
"While. we used to suffer from social evils, we now suffer 
from the remedies for the~." 73 
71 Ibid., p. 185. 
72Hayek, Constitution, pp. 343-349. · 
.•J. 
73 Ibid. , p. 304. 
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Even in the extreme case of people who work in jobs 
that are both low-paid and unpleasant, Hayek contends that 
their lot is better than it would be under available alter.-
·natives, as opposed to ideal ones. It is not a social in-
justice that people who hold unpleasant jobs make much less 
than those with interesting and enjoyable ones. Salaries 
reflect the value the market places on the work performed 
by the salaried employee. The odiousness of the job affects 
this equation only to the extent that it encourages those 
. who can to seek other jobs, reducing the supply of laborers, 
and putting upward pressure on the wage. The important thing 
is that people who clean sewers have more alternatives to 
gain higher pay or seek other employment than they would in 
other systems, where the cost of good intentions that might 
ameliorate the worker's lot is an unwieldly, stagnant economy 
that, at the very least, greatly complicates his efforts to 
b tt h . •t• 74 e er 1s own pos1 1on. 
The sort of egalitarianism that Hayek favors is the 
·type endorsed by most of the defenders of the market. 
·Equality, to Hayek, means the absence of legal privil_eges or 
government-secured advantages. It means the negative enforce-
ment of equal opportunity, the removal of artifical obstacles 
to anyone's career, but not the positive effort to try to 
74 Hayek, Mirage, pp. 91-93. 
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equalize everyone's "starting point."75 The unavoidable 
fact is that the conjunction of equality before the law and 
unequal natural endowments results in unequal social and 
economic conditions. Inequality of wealth and prestige in-
evitably accompanies freedom in a society of unique individu-
76 
als. To try to reverse this fact of nature requires exten-
sive and constant government action on behalf of every in-
77 dividual--a role for government antithetical to freedom. 
Hayek sees·a second difficulty with the effort to 
realize the egalitarian vision. In a market economy, people 
receive economic rewards for the ruthlessly pragmatic reason 
that they have satisfied some desire. No moral judgment on 
whether they were morally deserving of their wealth is im-
plied by these transactions, .beyond the belief that sellers 
of goods or services are entitled to the price their buyers 
have voluntarily agreed to. Some people will engage in 
after-the-fact rationalizations, claiming that differences 
in industriousness or foresight explain and justify the dif-
ferences between the rich and poor. Hayek insists that this 
moral judgment is wrongly. applied to capitalism, and is not. 
75Hayek, New Studies, pp. 141-142. 
·~ 8 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 5-88. 
77Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
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a part of the logic of the system: 
In our society personal esteem and material success 
are much too closely bound together. We ought to be 
much more aware-that if we regard a man as entitled 
to a high material reward that in itself does not 
necessarily entitle him to high esteem. And, though 
we are often confused on this point, it does not mean 
that this confusion is a necessary result of the 
enterprise system--or that in general the free enter-
prise system is more materialistic than other social 
orders.78 
The distinction between material entitlement and moral 
desert, always possible in a market economy though not always 
practiced, is completely untenable in a system where economic 
activity, including the distribution of income, is directed 
by a central authority. That authority must make allocation 
decisions according to selected criteria of desert; Hayek says 
that to wind up at the bottom of ·that distribution is not 
only to suffer physical deprivation but to be stigmatized as 
a least deserving citizen. Economic circumstances, in these 
economic systems, inevitably imply moral judgments. 79 
In addition to the devitalization of the economy, 
which. will harm the poor, and the corruption of the ideal of 
equality, which will humiliate them, departures from the mar-
ket establish precedents that cannot easily be repealed. As 
78 Hayek, Studies, p. 234. 
79Hayek, Constitution, pp. 95-99. 
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Hayek sees it, the fecundity of the market economy results 
from its participants' attitude that they must constantly 
strive to satisfy the desires of others as expressed through 
·the price system. If people generally held the contrary 
opinion that they were entitled to a decent living, or the 
continuity of some previous standard of living, even if the 
skill they wish to exercise is no longer demanded, the 
economy would perform much worse. Of course, to strive is 
not always to succeed, since the division of knowledge pre-
vents anyone from knowing all the obstacles and opportuni-
ties confronting him. The market, then, is "a mixed game of 
skill and chance.," the playing of which increases everyone's 
chance to prosper without guaranteeing anyone a particular 
1 1 f . 80 eve o 1ncome. 
Once we get the government.involved in the process of 
redistributing the winnings, it is extremely difficult to 
continue the game. People perceive that the satisfaction 
of economic wants· is of diminished importance to gaining 
. wealth; what really matters is the exercise of political 
power. · The progress of government intervention in the 
economy encourages, and is encouraged by, the shift ·in.human 
enterprise from the economic to the political arena. More 
80Hayek, Studies, pp. 174-175. 
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and more of the efforts once devoted to satisfying the 
demands for goods and services are now given over to lobby-
i b . . d . . 81 ng, arga1n1ng, an c~pa1gn1ng. 
Furthermore, Hayek believes that government interven-
tion ·in the economy contributes to a false, anthropomorphic 
view of society. The "primitive" instinct to-think of the 
social unit as an entity, rather than as a collection of 
individual entities, is relfected most clearly in the dis-
cussion of economic distribution. 82 The call for a fairer 
income distribution is usually expressed in terms of dis-
tributive or social justice. Hayek objects: 
There can be no distributive justice where no one 
distributes. Justice has meaning only as a rule of 
human conduct, and no conceivable rules for the con-
duct of individuals supplying each other with goods 
and services in a market economy would produce a 
distribution which could be meaningfully described 
as just or unjust.83 
If society were a person whose actions included parcelling 
out. wealth, then it would be reasonable to insist that he do 
so in accord with certain moral precepts. But no such pre-
cepts can be formulated that would guide the interactions of 
millions of people, who, needless to say, do not know one 
· Law, 
of a 
81 Hayek, New Studies, p. 64. 
Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 
Free People, p. 138 • 
See also F.A. Hayek, 
3: The Political Order 
. 82 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 9. 
83Hayek, New Studies, p. 58. 
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h d h . t t• . . • . . th 84 anot er an ave no 1n en 1ons v1s-a-v1s one ano er. 
As Hayek sees it, every redistributive corrective 
diminishes to one extent or another the values and arrange~ 
ments by which whole societies have only recently emerged 
from a history of poverty. Such an accomplishment deserves 
greater respect and fewer reforms. We can see how deep 
Hayek's commitment to the market and its distributive pro-
cess is by considering his support of the role of the 
"ability to make money," derided by Walzer. It is a fact, 
Hayek says, that a free society of modern complexity will 
often favor the person who knows how to package and sell his 
skills over an equally skilled person who waits for those 
demanding his services to find him. Though this emphasis on 
pragmatic resourcefulness if.often bitterly resented, it is 
· entirely appropriate that it should be rewarded. The market 
economy does not merely use skills, it uses them in an 
infinite and changing variety of ways. Men contribute to 
others not just· by having a skill, but by finding its best 
·employment. That economic rewards should reflect this fact 
is both predictable and desirable. 85 
85 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 80-83. 
42 
Because Hayek disavows any view of society as a col-
lective, his discussion of the role of the ability to make 
money is in terms of its usefulness to individuals. Walzer 
takes what Hayek would probably call an anthropomorphic 
posture by discussing how the "system rewards" money-making 
-
abilities. Walzer's stress on the aggregate has certain 
paternalistic implications. We could criticize democracy 
along the lines Walzer uses to criticize capitalism: In a 
well-governed society, political power would be exercised by 
men and women with certain important qualities--eloquence, 
organizational ability, prudence, courage, and integrity, to 
name only some. Yet in a democracy those who possess "the 
. vote-getting ability," a quality distinct from these others, 
are the ones who wind up with political power. Walzer's 
argument that people don't get the economy they want or ought 
to want from the money-makers is analagous to the claim that 
they don't get the polity they want or ought to want from 
the vote-getters. Each contention rests on the premise that 
the people's real preferences or best interests are known to 
certain people, whose acquisition of power is sufficient t.o 
do what the people want and need might well be a happy 
occasion. 
The thrust of Walzer's argument went beyond the asser-
tion that .sharp-eyed businessmen were the most likely bene-
ficiaries of capitalism. His larger clai~ was that even if 
43 
we knew the true moral desert of each individual~ distribut-
ing wealth accordingly would not guarantee that human needs 
received the attention-and the economic resources they de-
served. Only the implementation of the doctrine of right 
reasons, where particular goods correspond to particular 
needs can do that. Hayekts conception of egalitarianism 
does not seem to extend to Walzerts doctrine. Rather, Hayek 
views the egalitarian effort as an attempt to make receipt 
correspond to the moral desert of producers, their dedica-
tion, diligence, and so forth. {See above, IPP~ 17-18]). 
In this regard, Hayekts argument may be insufficient for 
meeting Wal~erts important codicil to the egalitarian 
critique. 
But we find even graver problems if we bring Hayek 1 s 
insistence on comparing programs rather than ideals to bear 
on Walzerts argument.. Hayek says that nthough a great many 
people are dissatisfied with the existing pattern of distri-
bution, none of tliem has really any clear idea of what pat-
tern he would regard as just."86 Walzert.s idea of to each 
according to his needs may be clear enough, but whether his 
program for realizing it, protecting legitimate distributive 
processes such as national health insurance by distributing 
income more or less equally, will succeed is open to question. 
86Hayek, New Studies, p. 58. 
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Even more worrisome is the propsect of harsh side-effects from 
the Walzer program.. The disincentive effects on production 
that concern Hayek a gl"~at deal are not mentioned by Walzer. 
Arguably., that is a technicality too abtruse for a single 
article on the ethical ideal of economic equality. But even 
a short article should not argue for matching goods with 
needs without showing that sufficient goods of the desired 
types are available, or suggesting how they might be produced, 
-
or mentioning how the government should face the difficult 
allocative decisions if the goods are not available. These 
are the sort of questions Hayek£s argument about comparing 
real alternatLves raises, and the sort that Walzerts argument 
does not answer .. 
rt we are to judge Hayek by this standard of real 
alternatLves, then we cannot yet accept his contention that 
-
cpaitalism is the best available. The resiliency of the 
market economy~. both as an economi.c system and a social 
structure, is still undetermined. If it can withstand a 
number of changes, then departures from it may not be so dis-
tressing as Hayek suggests. In Chapter Three we will con-
Sider Hayekr:s argument about law, whlc.h is his argument 
about the delicacy of the spontaneous order. In Chapter 
Four we will see what sort of efforts on behalf of the poor 
are consistent with the preservation of the spontaneous 
order. 
CHAPTER THREE 
KNOWN LAWS AND AN UNKNOWN ORDER 
Hayek wishes to argue that retaining capitalism will 
iasure every member of society a better chance to avoid 
poverty than altering or abolishing the market. He realizes 
why his task is extremely difficult; people who profit from 
government intervention in the economy have tangible evidence 
of their benefits·. The recipient of the government support 
check, or the worker in a tariff-protected industry, is fully 
aware that he owes his present standard of living to a govern-
ment effort. But the costs of intervening in the market 
economy, and the benefits of its unimpeded progress, are less 
easily discerned. We appreciate the jobs saved by the tariff; 
we don't notice the funds diverted to artificially competi-
tive domestic goods, or the loss of the productive capacities 
that might have been created had we been able to buy the 
cheapter imported goods and devote the residual funds to 
th . 87 o er purposes. 
The burden of Hay~k's philosophical writings, then, is 
to remind people of the less obvious facts, to appri·se them 
of the less tangible benefits available from the market. 
87 . Hayek, Eules and Order, pp. 56-57. 
45 
46 
Hayek must, like Tocqueville, for whom he frequently expres-
ses his admiration, inculcate a sort of "self-interest, 
rightly understood." Although Hayek's teaching is particu-
~arly inaccessible, requiring a sophisticated understanding 
of economic cause and effect that few people possess, he is 
determined that his own writing should counterbalance widely 
held beliefs. Hayek seems to have had his own work in mind 
when he wrote, "There is, ••• never so much reason for the 
political philosopher to suspect himself of failing in his 
88 task as when he finds that his opinions are very popular." 
We can be more precise about Hayek's view of his 
philosophical writings. He has written: 
It is the nurturing of the spontaneous forces of 
freedom that truly constitutes a service to society--
to that which has grown, as distinct from that which 
has been deliberately created--and to the further 
strengthening of the creative forces of the social 
process J~9 · 
Assuming that Hayek hopes his writings will "truly consti-
tute a service to society," we may conclude that the ultimate 
goal of his philosophy is to nurture the spontaneous order, 
a task which will regularly put him at odds with the more 
popular calls for reconstructing that order. 
88 Hayek, Constitution, p. 115. 
89 Hay~k, Studies, pp. 246-247. 
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But if society does indeed have the capacity to order 
itself spontaneously, what does it mean to nurture this pro-
cess, why is nurturing-necessary at all, and how does it 
differ from the sort of outside interference that impedes 
progress? To understand Hayek's theory of law is to under-
stand the nurturing of the spontaneous order,-because Hayek 
regards the law as the most important device for "strengthen-
ing the creative forces of the social process." 
We may begin to understand Hayek's theory of law by 
noting his definition of order: 
A state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements 
of various kinds are so related to each other that we 
may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or 
temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations 
concerning the rest, or at least expectations which 
have a good chance of proving correct.90 
Order, then, does not require uniformity, only that diversity 
does not overwhelm us. When Hayek says that we have experi-
enced progress he does not mean that societies are more 
easily comprehensible because they are simpler. Rather, it 
is possible to comprehend an ever smaller portion of the 
social order and still pursue one's goals. The advance of 
civilization is characterized by an increase in the number of 
important operations that can be performed without thinking 
about them. 91 
90 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 36. 
91Hayek, Individualism, pp. 88-89. 
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For thousands of years groups of hunters were the 
highest form of social organization. Under these circum-
stances, says Hayek, every aspect of life was secondary to 
the pursuit of the common prey. The social imperatives were 
so st'rong as to erase any real individuality. It was not 
until the first tentative exchanges of food or tools between 
members of different tribal groups that the possibility of a 
different life was conceivable. Community membership no 
longer. had to be the decisive fact of life, and the notion 
of individual goals, distinct from the community's, and to 
which the collective teleology might have to accede, was 
first realized. A new sort of social organization was pos-
sible, characterized by mutual.satisfaction of individual 
goals rather than collective pursuit of common goals. The 
process of social evolution caused these new societies to 
displace the older, teleologically constricted ones. 92 
The emergence of this new society made the existence 
of laws both possible and necessary. Possible, because hav-
ing come to understand the intrinsic worth of individual 
goals, men perceive that ~ society organized by commands is 
unnecessary. When the pursuit of the common goal was· all-
important, directives by the leadership to coordinate that 
92Hayek, New Studies·, pp. 58-62; and Hayek, Studies, 
p. 70. 
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pursuit were necessary. Now that central superintendence of 
social life is not necessary, the government's directives can 
be of a prohibitory nature, defining what can't be done, but 
capable of being obeyed in a variety of ways, rather than 
positive commands. The new society made laws necessary be-
cause the old society's source of order, central commands, 
had been superseded. If the ability to form plausible ex-
. 
pectations about the whole of society based on knowledge of 
a part of it was to be maintained, general prohibitions would 
be necessary. Laws did not come forward from some grand de-
sign for society, but emerged one by one as people perceived 
. 
inordinate difficulties in forming correct expectations con-
cerning that part of society they did not know first-hand. 93 
The emergence of this new social order culminated, 
after slow and painful growth, is what Hayek calls the Great 
Society or the Open Society. In the Great Society, "indi-
viduals are constrained only to obey the abstract rules that 
demarcate the domain of the means that each is allowed to 
94 
use for his purposes." The realization of the Great 
Society coincides with the complete disappearance of the 
93Hayek, Constitution, pp. 149-150; and Hayek, New 
Studies, pp. 10-11. 
94Hayek, Mirage, p. 144. 
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belief that any collective purposes exist, the attainment of 
which merits the use of the government's coercive powers. 
Hayek refers to Michael Oakeshott's terminological distinc-
tion between teleocracy and nomocracy to explain the Great 
Society. The Great Society, or the nomocracy, is an abstract 
order; it does not exist for anything, except the facilita-
tion of the pursuit by individuals of their own goals. The 
teleocracy, on the other hand, "treats some goals pursued by 
some people as exceptionally worthy, elevating them to the 
status of the common good, .whose realization may be furthered 
by using the power of the state. 95 
The development from absolute teleocracy ·to the Great 
Society corresponds to the change from rule by command to the 
Rule of Law. Hayek explains tha~ the ultimate legislator can 
never limit his own powers by law, because he can always 
abrogate any law he has made. The Rule of Law is therefore 
"not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what the law 
ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or political ideal."96 
It will be effective only to the extent that the Rule of Law 
is embraced by the rulers and, in turn, by the society at 
large. Hayek speaks of the system formed by the meta-legal 
95Hayek, New Studies, p. 89. 
96Hayek, Constitution, p. 206. 
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doctrine as follows: 
Every rule of this kind will in intention be perpetual, 
though subject to revision in light of better insight 
. into its interaction with other rules; and it will be 
valid only as a system.of mutually modifying rules. 
These rules will achieve their intended effect of secur-
ing the formation of an abstract order of actions only 
through their universal application, while their appli-
cation in the particular instance cannot be said to 
have a specific purpose distinct from the purpose of 
the system of rules as a whole.97 
Within such a system we may expect that particular laws will 
be "general rules of individual conduct, applicable to all 
alike in an unknown number of future instances, defining the 
protected domain of individuals, and therefore essentially of 
the nature of prohibitions rather than of specif"ic commands."98 
The concept of Rule of Law is so important to Hayek's 
thought that it requires examinat:ion in some detail. The 
first feature of the Rule that Hayek elaborates is "isonomy," 
the doctrine that every law should be equally applicable to 
each member of society. It is an ideal that originated in 
ancient Greek political thought. As Hayek employs it, iso-
nomy is a procedureal guarantee of justice, valuable because 
a substantive rule of justice cannot be found. While we can-
not tell lawmakers what qualities just laws must have, if we 
97Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 122. 
98 Hayek, New Studies, p. 135. 
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insist that they themselves be subject to all the laws they 
enact, we can be assured that the laws will not be onerous. 
A government of laws, not men, is to be attained by prevent-
ing any group of governors from placing themselves above the 
99 law. 
Even greater generality of the law is obtained by 
making each law applicable to all future instances, as well 
as to all those in the society at the time it is enacted. 
''The lawmaker [must] prove his belief in the justice of his 
pronouncements by committing himself to their universal appli-
cation to an unknown number of future instances and renounc-
ing the power of modifying their application to particular 
cases."
100 According to Hayek, freedom is enhanced when the 
law is concerned with general matters and the legislators 
are incapable of knowing how their actions will affect par-
ticular people. As the effects of legislation on particular 
people become a matter of legislative concern, the ability 
. to make fair decisions is strained. Law becomes more and 
more a matter of helping or hurting particular persons, and 
its acceptance as a legit~ate regulator of human affairs 
erodes. 101 
99 Hayek, Constitution, pp. 154-156, 164-165. 
100 Hayek, New Studies, p. 99. 
101Hayek, Road to Serfdom, pp. 76-79. 
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In addition to being general, law must be negative. 
Justice consists of general prohibitions on the sort of 
·means that any citizen JI18.Y employ to achieve his goals. It 
does not entail positive commands telling us what ends to 
102 pursue. Liberty is similarly negative. We should strive 
for a condition in which "all is permitted that is not pro-
hibited by general rules," rather than one where "all is pro-
hibited that is not explicitly permitted."103 
Hayek feels that in modern society the negative view 
of law is the road not taken. Most laws at present do not 
take the forms of prohibitions to the citizenry, but instruc-
tion from the legislature to the civil servants, explaining 
. what goals are to be pursued and how. In Hayek's view, the 
chief threat to liberty in our age is the growth of admini-
strative discretion over citizens and their property. The 
government too often equates policy with law, legalizing any 
efforts to accomplish its chosen purposes, even if the result-
ing government.actions are unequal, biased, and erratic. 104 
We must distinguish that nurturing by the government of the 
102Hayek, Studies, p. 167. 
103Hayek, Constitution, p. 19. 
104Ibi.d., pp. 207-219. 
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spontaneous order, which facilitates individuals' efforts 
to act upon their particular body of knowledge, from govern-
ment interference in the spontaneous order. Hayek says the 
"distinction between oiling a mechanism and rebuilding it is 
. 105 
comparable. 
The third feature of Hayek's theory of law is the 
guarantee to each citizen of a protected sphere of activity. 
Hayek places himself in the long tradition of classical 
liberalism calling for the maximum extension of the protected 
sphere consistent with equally large spheres for all citizens. 
Each citizen should be guaranteed his life, liberty, and pro-
perty, and assured that claims resulting from valid con-
tracts will be recoverable. 106 Since no security exists in 
a "war of all against all," the government must have a mono-
poly of legal physical force to secure the private spheres 
of the citizens. But the government's power cannot legiti-
mately extend to violations of the realm of private action 
it exists to defend. Government restrictions on actions 
that do not affect others, such as religious practices, are 
utijustified. 107 
105Hayek, Mirage, p. 129. 
106nayek, Studies, p. 167. 
l07.H k C · t• 20 21 d H k Rul aye , onst1tu 1on, pp. - ; an aye , es 
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"The essence of a free society," says Hayek, "is 
that the private individual is not one of th~' resources 
which government admiil._isters, and that a free person can 
.count on using a known domain of personal resources on the 
108 basis of his knowledge and for his purposes." The belief 
that the tendency of modern life is to treat-the individual 
exactly as a resource at the government's disposal is the 
theme of Hayek's first and most famous political work, 
The Road to Serfdom, written in 1944. Its thesis is that 
economic planning is the first step on the road to serfdom, 
to a totalitarian society. Written at a time when Hitler 
was threatening free societies, and economic planning, the 
determination of certain allocative and productivities by 
government, was advocated by som~ as the appropriate program 
for the post-War era, the book was extremely controversial. 
Hayek argued that it was almost impossible to introduce a 
limited amount of planning into a free economy. If the 
government tries to confine itself to certain basic decisions 
it will find that some of the consequences vitiate its goals 
or are otherwise unacceptable, requiring further and more 
. . 
d "1 d 1 . 109 eta1 e government p ann1ng. 
108uayek, New Studies, p. 99. 
109 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 105. 
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Part of the danger of the planning lies in the charac-
ters of theose who are drawn to the government of a planned 
economy. Hayek feels that planning appeals to all single-· 
minded enthusiasts for a particular scheme or project. Their 
certainity about the desirability of their pet project makes 
them enthusiasts for a system where goverpment power and 
funds might be available to promote it. The fact that a 
planned economy cannot further more than a handful of these 
schemes does not discourage such people; on the contrary, 
it spurs them on to more intense intra-governmental skir-
mishing over budgets and authority. 110 At the broader level 
of mass support, the planned economy is popular because it 
feeds on the resentment of successful men and failure of the 
market to achieve certain ideals. "It is easier for people 
to agree on a negative program ••• than on any positive 
task."lll As long as the planners can promote their system 
as something other than capitalism, they will be assured of 
popular support. 
A further difficulty with planning is that it is in-
compatible with the Rule of Law. The attainment of pre-
selected goals of economic production or distribution 
110Ib~d., pp. 52-55. 
111Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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requires governments to vary their demands on the citizenry 
from time to time and person to person. Uniform laws applied 
to an indefinite number of contingencies will leave too much 
discretion to the people--any number of economic facts might 
emerge, many of them very different from those the govern-
ment desires. Steering the economy back towards the selec-
ted results will require unremitting efforts by the govern-
ment; and, because a legislature lacks the expertise or 
institutional capacity to superintend a modern economy, the 
planning and supervision of economic activity is delegated 
to bureaucracies empowered with vast discretionary authority. 
The government must have this authority if it is to plan, 
and if it has such authority the legal environment may 
change so rapidly that individuals cannot make or pursue 
th . 1 112 eJ.r own p ans. 
So the government may become increasingly petty, 
erratic, and burdensome. Is the necessary culmination of 
this development vicious totalitarianism? Some of Hayek's 
critics have argued that Serfdom's thesis is guilty of 
simple determinism. Cultrual and political factors have 
too great an effect on the course of a nation's history to 
112Ibid., pp. 61-71. 
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attribute every modern dictatorship to planning. 113 Hayek 
insists that planning does indeed engender totalitarianism, 
but that this cu-lmination may require generations. The 
principle consequence of planning is that the people's 
attachment to freedom is slowly lost by attrition. The 
government's activism produces a psychological change in 
the people that makes further government encroachment 
acceptable, and the ultimate attainment of total government 
power unremarkabl·e. 114 
Planning was nowhere embraced to the extent its sup-
porters, such as Wassily Leontief, had hoped. 115 What we 
have instead, says Hayek, is "interventionist chaos," as 
removed from pure capitalism as it is from central plan-
ning.116 The vague aspiration that guides this chaos is that 
we can have the spontaneous order and remake it too. It is 
in just such a polity that government intervention is likely 
to increase without limit. 117 
113see, for example, Barbara Wooton, Freedom Under 
Planning, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1945), pp. 28-29. 
114 Hayek, Studies, p. 224. 
115Hayek, New Studies, pp. 232-242. 
116Hayek, Individualism, p. 136. 
ll7H k M" 142 143 aye , 1rage, pp. -
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Hayek sometimes seems to regard democracy as the 
spontaneous order's worst friend. 118 Perhaps a benevolent 
dictator, fully appreciative of the market's capacities, 
would do the best job nurturing the spontaneous order. But 
Hayek is aware of the dangers of this arrangement, and re-
mains a democrat, albeit a concerned and unetbusiastic one. 
He does accept democracy as a mechanism for the resolution 
of conflict without resorting to violence, and he retains 
some hope, despit~ his observations of democracy's flaws, 
that the experience of self-government might promote a cer-
tain caution and prudence in the citizens' approach to pub-
11·c ff . 119 a a1rs. 
We have noted that Hayek values liberty only because 
it is conducive to progress. Similarly, Hayek supports 
democracy only to the extent that it promotes freedom. The 
governing majority is capable, he feels, of measures inimi-
cal to liberty. In the short-run they may be a threat only 
to those outside the majority. But over time a democracy can 
extinguish liberty throughout a whole society. If democrats 
arrogate to themselves the power to shape every aspect of 
social life, innovation will disappear. A society that 
119Hayek, Constitution, pp. 107-109. 
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changes only as the majority approves will stagnate, and in 
such a society liberty is superfluous and will be regarded 
·h· 120 as sue • 
Hayek insists on distinguishing support for liberty 
from support for democracy. The opposite of a free society 
is, he says, totalitarianism, where every aspect of life is 
subject to government superintendence, and where people have 
"rights" only to the extent that government neglects to 
regulate some actions. The opposite of democracy is authori-
tarianism, in which the people have no voice in determining 
who governs and how. However strong the support liberty and 
democracy give to each other, it is important to understand 
that their coincidence is not inevitable. A democracy could 
degenerate into a totalitarian society, and, to the extent 
that such an occurrence is likely, the liberty of the people 
. ht b 1 1 bl d th •t . . t 121 m1g e ess vu nera e un er an au or1 ar1an governmen • 
Even the word "democracy" worries Hayek; he would prefer his 
neologism, "demarchy, '' to stress the people's rule rather 
than their power. The rule of the people is more consistent 
with the insistence that_they obey certain cannons of justfce 
120Ibid.-, pp. 103-107, and 109-115. 
121 Hayek, Studies, p. 161. 
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than is the stressing, or glorifying, of the raw power they 
122 possess. 
The fear that ~~mocracy has become an ever greater 
.menace to liberty assumes a prominent place in Hayek's recent 
work·. He is especially concerned that the separation of 
powers has proven inadequate for the prevention of the rise 
of unlimited democracy. Whatever security is provided by 
the existen~e of separate judicial and executive branches is 
more than erased by the possession by the legislature of two 
quite different powers, the writing of laws and the making 
of government policy. The same governmental body charged 
with formulating rules of just conduct applicable to all per-
sons for the indefinite future is also empowered to direct 
the government's resources towards the realization of policy 
goals of its own choice. The problem, as Hayek sees it, is 
that when the perservation of established laws conflicts 
with the attainment of policy goals, the former is routinely 
sacrificed to the latter. 123 This may be done by constant 
legislative action, or it may come about as a result of the 
legislature delegating the discretionary authority to pursue 
policy goals to a bureaucracy, a process American political 
122 Hayek, New Studies, pp. 93-94. 
123Ibid., pp. 98-101. 
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scientist Theodore Lowi describes as "policy without 
1 11124 aw. 
As a measure of_his concern, perhaps his desperation, 
.about the erosion of the protected sphere formed by known 
and certain laws, Hayek has argued that the institutions of 
modern democracies need to be altered to provide further 
separation of powers. Hayek proposes the creation of a new 
legislative body. The presently constituted legislatures 
would continue making policy and directing the government's 
re:sources. The new legislature would assume the powers for 
writing laws that actually inform the citizen what he may 
. 
not legally do. Though popularly elected, this legislature 
would be relatively immune to democratic pressures to alter 
: 
the law, because legislators wou~d serve for fifteen years 
. ' 125 
and be ineligible for re-elect1on. The judiciary would 
resolve disputes over the jurisdictional boundary between 
the law and policy legislature, as well as deciding whether 
a proposed policy contravenes the law. 126 Hayek does not 
expect that his plan will ever be put into action, but he 
124Theodore 'J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The 
Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company), pp. 92-125~ 
125 Hayek, New Studies, pp. 102-104 
126Hayek Political Order, pp. 120-121. 
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feels that it serves as a way to illuminate the need for 
distinguishing policy-making from law-making. 127 
Hayek's desire for greater separation of powers has 
more behind it than the desire that form should follow func-
tion in government. Something needs to be done to compen-
sate for the type of pressures brought to bear on modern 
governments. The disease of democracy is the interest-
group domination of representative assemblies; the policies 
that emerge are inevitably bundles of favors for different 
groups. Because the modern legislature possesses so much 
power there is no demand that it is not expected to satisfy. 
Concern about writing good and equitable laws plays no part 
as coalitions are stapled together. 128 Hayek says there is 
no constituency lobbying for the ~ule of Law: 
The almost exclusive concern of the representatives 
with government rather than legislation is a conse-
quence of the fact that they know that their re-elec-
tion depends chiefly on the record of their party in 
government and not on legislation. It is the voters' 
satisfaction with the immediate effects of govern-
mental measures, not their judgment of the effect of 
alterations in the law, noticeable only in ~ge long 
run, which they will express at the polls.l 
127Hayek, New Stud.ies, p. 118. 
128Hayek, Political Order, pp. 1-19. 
129Ibid., p. 29. 
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The present unification of policy-making and law-
making results in both tasks being done poorly, says Hayek. 
Policies that could be-directed towards prudently selected 
.·long-range goals are instead Balkanized into a list of con~ 
cessions to interests. The only internal logic of such 
policies is that they placate factions that could terminate 
political careers. The law-making is inadequate because the 
entire process has become subordinate to mollifying groups 
through policy. When confronted with an issue like abor-
tion or capital punishment, where concessions and gestures 
to an array of interest groups is not possible, modern 
legislators are helpless. Such issues require them to 
articulate and act upon a public philosophy, and these are 
k rll th h 1 t f d" 130 s 1 s ey ave os rom 1suse. 
Hayek believes that his proposal, which we might call 
functional bicameralism, would provide a buffer between the 
lawmaking assembly and the-political pressures of organized 
interest groups. The law makers would have long terms of 
office and no concerns about re-election, enabling them to 
resist any outside press~res to do anything but write laws -
as fairly as they can. Even the policy-making legislature 
Will be rescued from excessive lobbying, because the Rule 
130 . Ibid.,_pp. 30-31. 
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of Law will circumscribe the policy-making process; efforts 
to pressure the policy legislature or the bureaucracy to 
ignore the law will b~_pointless. As an additional measure 
for protecting the government from interest-group pressures, 
Hayek would disenfrancise those who work for the government 
. 131 
and those who receive government assistance. -
A final quality of the Rule of Law remains to be con-
sidered. We have noted that Hayek feels that true laws 
should be universal, in the sense of applying to every mem-
ber of society and to an indefinite number of future con-
tingencies, negative, and should describe a protected domain 
of activity for every citizen. Theoretically, a society 
could arrive at a body of law that possessed these qualities. 
If it did so, would any change be necessary? Would there 
be anything left for Hayek's law-making legislature, or any 
existing legislature, to do? According to Hayek, a law con-
' 
sonant with the Rule of Law is "subject to revision in the 
light of better insight into its interaction with other 
rules.11132 This better insight may be the result of new 
intellectual apprehension, but it is more likely that the 
changing course of human activity in the spontaneous _order 
131 Ibid., pp. 115, 120. 
132 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 122. 
66 
will create unanticipated conflicts between lawful actions. 
In the resolution of these conflicts new laws are created, 
and these new laws sho~ld be extensions of the Rule of Law 
133 
.to new human endeavors or problems. 
The capacity of the Rule of Law to grow incrementally 
to meet new contingencies is explained by the reciprocal 
relationship between law and a civilization's ideas of 
justice. The law shapes and is shaped by a civilization's. 
ideas about what the law ought to be. Hayek writes: 
It is not only in his knowledge, but also in his aims 
and values, that man is the creature of civilization; 
in the last resort, it is the relevance of these in-
dividual wishes to the perpetuation of the group or 
the species that will determine whether they will 
persist or change. It is, of course, a mistake to 
believe that we can draw conclusions about what our 
values ought to be simply because we realize that 
they are a product of evolution. But we cannot 
reasonably doubt that these values are created and 
altered by the same evolutionary forces that have pro-
duced our intelligence. All that we can know is the 
ultimate decision about what is good or bad will be 
made not by individual human wisdom but by the decli~~ 
of groups that have adhered to the "wrong" beliefs.l 
Is it ~ot an intolerable burden on the legislator that 
his decisions should affect not only the citizens of a 
society, but will determine the life or death of his entire-
society? Hayek says that legislators do not need to assume 
the burden of protecting their entire way of life, because 
133Hayek, Studies, p. 168. 
134 Hayek, Constitution, p. 36. 
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the fate of a civilization depends on qualities that legisla-
tors or laws can affect but not alter. Laws do not have a 
purpose, even the preservation of a society; laws can only 
facilitate the various goals pursued by the members of a 
society. Laws do not exist to fashion a particular order 
but to nurture the spontaneous order, to guarantee that 
abstract order, or quality of orderliness, that makes the 
emergence of a concrete order with particular characteristics 
possible. To attempt more is beyond the legislator's capa-
cities: 
The "social goal" or "common purpose," for which 
society is to be organized is usually vaguely de-
scribed as the "common good," the "general welfare," 
or the "general interest." It does not need much 
reflection to see that these terms have no suf-
ficiently definite meaning to determine a particular 
course of action. The wel·fare and the happiness of 
millions c~gnot be measured on a single scale of less 
and more.l 
The hubris that leads some to suppose that the law 
can be a device for organizing an entire society in a desired 
way can be traced back to constructive rationalism. The 
source of constructive rationalism is Cartesian dualism, the 
belief that mind can stand outside nature, enabling man to 
"design the institutions of society and culture among which 
. 136 he lives." The fact that Descrates praised Sparta because 
135Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 57. See also Hayek, 
· Rules and Order, pp. 112-115. 
136Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 17. 
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its laws, "originated by a single individual,. • all 
tended to a single end," is characteristic of the belief 
that the deliberately,constructed is "necessarily superio:r; 
137 
'to all mere growth." The fact of the matter, Hayek in-
sists, is that the human mind "is as much the product of 
-
the social environment" as it is a force that has "acted 
upon and altered social institutions."138 What Cartesians 
suppose is the rational determination of social goals is 
rather the working out of the unique logic of a particular 
social order. 
So, there is no common good, and even if there were, 
people could not sufficiently transcend their time and place 
to perceive it. Good govern·ance then consists of applying 
our opinions, reflecting the ideals of our society, to the 
Rule of Law, rather than relying on human will to ascertain 
objects for thE, government to pursue. We should approach 
an extant body of laws as executors of an estate rather than 
authors of a w,ill. As good executors we will try to carry 
out the expressed wishes of a written will to the best of 
our ability, even if it requires us to execute decisions 
we would not ourselves have made. If the circumstances we 
137 Hayek, New Studies, p. 255. The passage by Des-
cartes is ta~en from the Discourse on Method, part II. 
138Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 17. 
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confront were not anticipated by the will's author then we 
must seek to resolve the issue in the way most consistent 
with the will's provisions; we cannot impose any solution 
that we happen to like. The Rule of Law requires us to 
approach the task of governance with the same respect for 
precedent, the same reluctance to strike out for new desti-
nations. According to Hayek: 
The larger the groups within which we hope to live 
in peace, the more the common values which are 
enforced must be confined to abstract and general 
rules of conduct. The members of an Open Society 
have and can have in common only g~inions on values 
but not a will on concrete ends.l 
Hayek has located his own understanding of society 
somewhere between the ancient alternatives of nature and 
convention (see above pp. 29-30). Similarly, his legal philo-
sophy lies somewhere between legal positivism and natural 
law. His critique of the former is uncompromising. Hayek 
sees legal positivism as the greatest threat to the Rule of 
Law. By holding.that lawfulness is a merely factual quality, 
requiring only the appropriate procedures by the appropriate 
agencies, legal positivism supports the view that any law, -
no matter how flagrantly it violates the sphere of ~ersonal 
l .b . f 11 1 •t• t 140 ~ erty, 1s u y eg1 1ma e. Legal positivism thus 
139 Hayek, New Studies, p. 88. 
140Hayek, Constitution, pp. 236-239. 
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stands as an invitation to use the law for any purposes the 
legislator desires; Hayek regards it as a modern expression 
f t t . t. 1' 141 o cons rue lVe ra lena lsm. 
In rejecting legal positivism Hayek does not embrace 
natural law. He regards the common law tradition as an 
alternative attributable to human action but not to human, 
or natural, design. He explains his position this way: 
If we do not insist that the test of justice must 
enable us to build up a whole system of new rules of 
just conduct, but are content persistently to apply 
the negative test of injustice to the parts of an 
inherited system, the greater part of whose rules 
are universally accepted, we may accept the conten-
tion of positivism that there are no positive cri-
teria of justice; yet we can still maintain that the 
further development of the rules of just conduct is 
not a matter of arbitrary will but of inner neces-
sity, and that solutions to open problems of justice 
are discovered, not .arbitrarily decreed.l42 
By the "negative test.of injustice" Hayek refers to the com-
mon law process of modifying the law by discarding new laws 
or new applications of old laws that are unjust by virtue of 
the "inner necess::j_ty" of the whole legal order. 
We will postpone until later (Chapter Five) a discus-
sian of how successful Hayek has been in navigating a cours~ 
. . 
betwt>.en legal positivism and natural law. For the present it 
141 Hayek, Studies, pp. 101-104. 
142Hayek, Mirage, P· 44. 
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would be useful to see how Hayek applies his theory of law 
to a controversy impinging on the distribution of income. 
We will select Hayek's choice of the issue "on which the 
whole character of future society will depend"--progressive 
taxation. 143 The question of progressive taxation is not 
identical with that of income redistribution.- A measure of 
progressivity in income tax rates may be instituted only 
to offset the regressive effects of measures like the sales 
tax. Similarly, income could be redistributed without re-
sorting to a progressive tax. If a proportional income tax 
were high enough it could generate revenues to provide for 
government services to the poor, a type of redistribution. 
But in the main, progressive taxation is the chief means of 
effecting income redistribution in modern societies. 144 
The history of progressivity is, in Hayek's eyes, the 
triumph of will over opinion. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury progressivity was explicitly argued as a device for 
bringing about the redistribution of income, as well as for 
advancing other socialist goals. It was rejected at the 
time p·recisely because the goals of the Left were rejected, 
says Hayek. Around the turn of the century, a new case for 
progressivity was made in terms of ability to pay, or 
143Hayek, Constitution, p. 306. 
144 ibid., pp. 307-308. 
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equality of sacrifice. The discipline of political economy 
was being transformed by utility theory at the time. Its 
leading English exponent was Alfred Marshall, while the 
chief Continental economists were Carl Menger and Eugene 
Bohm-Bawerk, two Austrians who established a tradition of 
economic thought in Austria of which Hayek is the best 
twentieth-century representative. Utility theory holds that 
consumption decisions can be explained in terms of the 
diminishing satisfaction provided by the consumption of an 
additional unit of any good. It was at first thought that 
the theory could be the basis for interpersonal comparisons. 
It was the application of this form of the utility theory 
that led some to believe we could determine scientifically 
I 
how much a person with a $50,000'income would have to pay in 
taxes before he had sacrificed as much as a person with a 
$25,000 income paying a given level of taxes. Later re-
finements of utility theory discarded the idea of utility 
as an objective quality inhering in money or other economic 
goods. Utility is now understood as a subjective quality, 
which removes the "scientific" justification from the 
equ~.lity-of-sacrifice argument--economists no longer purport 
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to know at what point different tax rates will inflict equal 
d . t 145 1s ress. 
If equality of sacrifice was no longer academically 
respectable it was quite popular by the early twentieth cen-
tury. Those who objected to progressive taxes because they 
wanted to preserve equality before the law we~e assured that 
equal sacrifice was the only goal in view-. Those who claimed 
that progressivity opened the door to legislative caprice 
and arbitrariness_were charged with "betraying a reprehen-
sible lack of confidence in the wisdom of democratic govern-
t "146 men • As Hayek sees it, this lack of confidence was soon 
fully justified; rates went from mildly to steeply progres-
sive within a few years after the acceptance of the principle 
of progression. The argument for progression has come full 
circle, it is now defended in terms of redistribution once 
again. 
Part of Hayek's brief against the progressive income 
tax is that of an economist. He says that progressivity 
causes only a very small net increase in the government's in-
. . 
come, so it is not necessary for preserving government social 
145Ibid., pp. 308-309. See also, Everett J. Burtt, 
Jr.; Social Perspectives in the History of Economic Thought 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), pp. 173-200. 
146Hayek, Constitution, p. 310. 
147Ibid., pp. 310-311. 
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prcgrams. Nor are the poor the main beneficiaries of a 
progressive tax. The more numerous working class winds up 
with the lightest tax burden. 148 Progressivity does pose 
· a great barrier to the creation of wealth. For example, 
people who will tolerate lean years waiting for a project 
to become profitable are punished if it does-so suddenly, 
pushing them into high tax brackets. Indeed, the progres-
sive tax places a lighter burden on the rich than it does 
on those who are trying to become rich, because it is new 
ventures that are especially dependent on sudden freshets 
of income. By burdening these enterprises, progressive 
taxes protect old money and established businesses. 149 
But the really threatening aspect of progressive 
taxation, in Hayek's eyes, is its departure from the Rule 
of Law. It is by definition contrary to isonomy, since a 
progressive tax is really a series of different tax laws 
for different gi-oups. The protection that isonomy affords 
the private domain of citizens is eliminated; freed from 
the worry of making their laws universal, legislators may 
treat the tax code as a confiscatory device. Once the 
principle of progressivity is accepted there is no limit 
148Ibid., pp. 311-313. 
1
~
9 Ibid., pp. 315-321. 
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to which it may be imposed. 150 Democracies in particular 
are prone to carry progression to extremes, because it 
invites the majority to make the minority pay for government 
·programs. As Hayek says: 
Democracy has yet to learn that, in order to be just 
it must be guided in its action by general princi-
ples •••• Where, as in the case of progression, 
the so-called principle adopted is no more than an 
open invitation to discrimination and, what is worse, 
an invitation to the majority to discriminate against 
a minority, the pretended principle of justice be-
comes the pretext for pure arbitrariness.l51 
We can extend Hayek's argument against progressive 
taxation, the best-established redistributive device, to the 
redistributive process generally. We have already seen that 
Hayek prizes the spontaneous order as the surest path to 
prosperity. Efforts to circumvent that order to see that 
people get what the government thinks they need or deserve 
have the effect of diminishing the chances that poor people 
have for attaining self sufficiency. The study of Hayek's 
theory of law establishes the additional point that there is 
a strong tendency for government alteration of the spontan-
eous order to feed on itself. The logic of the redistri-
butive process is to render inevitable measures once con-
sidered Wlthinkable. Departures from the Rule of Law not 
only impede progress, but they establish momentum towards 
l 5? Ibid., pp. 313-315. 
151Ibid., p. 314. 
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centrally directing every aspect of social life that is all 
but irresistable. Not only does the steadily worsening 
economy elicit calls for more government measures to protect 
.the citizenry (from the consequences of established govern-
ment measures), but the steady growth of government makes 
each new addition to its responsibilities less objectionable. 
The Hayekian response to the egalitarian critique of 
capitalism may be summarized as follows: 1) The question is 
not whether capitalism, and its concomitant distribution of 
income, is the best system imaginable, but whether it is the 
best available. It is beside the point, therefore, to dwell 
on the moral shortcomings of capitalism unless one can pro-
pose a feasible alternative that satisfies our moral concerns. 
2) A feasible alternative to capitalism will find some way to 
continue capitalism's generation of wealth; otherwise, the 
amount of wealth to be distributed will be less than re-
quired to give everyone what they need or deserve. Hayek 
doubts that such an alternative is available, because of the 
essential roles that the division of knowledge and reward 
according to market value_play in producing wealth. 3) A 
. . 
feasible alternative to capitalism will find some internal 
controls on its political program to.keep the redistribution 
of wealth according to need or desert from degenerating into 
the satisfaction of envy or the placating of the most 
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numerous or powerful groups in society. Hayek doubts that 
any redistribution of income can proceed within the frame-
work of the Rule of Law, and that any system eschewing th~ 
Rule of Law can find an alternative that does not subject 
the citizen to arbitrary, erratic, and intrusive rules of 
conduct. 
Hayek's argument is compelling to the extent that his 
insistence on examining real alternatives and on the impro-
bability of making limited changes in capitalism is compel-
ling. Hayek's demand that we confine ourselves to real 
possibilities cannot be faulted. His argument that the 
spontaneous order nurtured by the Rule of Law is indivisible 
is more questionable. The first suggestion that the spon-
taneous order might be capable of sustaining revision comes 
from Hayek's own writings on what the government of a 
modern society may justifiably do. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
WHAT GOVERNMENT MAY DO 
Let us suppose that everything Hayek claims for the 
spontaneous order is true. The free market is vastly more 
productive than any other arrangement. The poor are afforded 
a greater opprotunity to escape from poverty under capitalism 
than in any alternative system. The progress of the spon-
taneous order will regularly cause unemployment in sectors 
of the economy; people selling skills that have become 
obsolete, such as carriage makers, will be unemployed. But 
the new demands and productive techniques that supplanted 
the carriage industry will create new opportunities in other 
sectors, such as automobile manufacturing. It is not neces-
sary that unemployed carriage makers have comprehensive 
knowledge of the structural changes in the economy. The 
operation of the price system will make information about 
new job opportunities easily accessible. 
Even if all this is true, are we fully prepared to 
accept all the consequences of the market's distribution of 
income? Is Hayek? He has described the market distrjbution 
of income as a mixed game of skill and luck,- the playing of 
which increases everyone's chances of attaining economic 
success •. But no matter how large the jackpot, some players 
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are going to be without skills, and others without luck. 
The severely handicapped and the people unable to find work 
despite their best efforts will lose this game of skill and 
.chance. More successful players may decide to give some of 
thei~ winnings to the least fortunate--altruism being com-
patible with individualism--but whether their gifts are 
sufficient to rescue the poor from abject misery is also, 
from the perspective of the poor, a matter of luck. If, as 
Hayek says, "the only way in which we can effectively improve 
[the spontaneous order] is by improving the abstract rules 
which guide the individuals," then the spontaneous order 
seems incapable of being altered in ways beneficial to the 
152 poor. 
By taking such a position, Hayek seems to place him-
self. in the ranks of the advocates of laissez-faire. To 
"allow to act" is precisely the posture one should take, pre-
sumably, towards a society capable of spontaneously ordering 
itself in the way.most congenial to its citizens. Herman 
Finer's attack on The Road to Serfdom, titled Road to 
'Reaction, was one of the earliest and most vitriolic attacks 
on Hayek for being just the sort of social philosopher who 
would accept the misery of the poor rather than government 
152Hayek, Studies, p. 92. (Italics mine.) 
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intervention in the market. 153 
And yet, almost at the outset of The Road to Serfdom, 
Hayek insists that he-is not an advocate of laissez-faire. 
·He argues that the market economy has been unfortunate in 
having so many proponents who, unlike Hayek, understand it 
wholly in terms of rigid fealty to laissez-faire. The cri-
tics of capitalism, he says, have been immeasurably assisted 
by the existence of this strident, uncompromising argument. 
They do not have ·to construct a caricature of the case for 
the market, and are free to ignore more subtle and cautious 
154 arguments, such as Hayek's. 
This chapter will examine the degree to which Hayek's 
political thought differs from the advocacy of a "minimal 
state." The usual definition of laissez-faire is that it 
is a political system where the government confines itself 
to the prevention of force or fraud. 155 Hayek believes that 
the defenders of the market economy must consider two other 
areas of governemnt action if the market is to be preserved. 
153 Herman Finer, Road to Reaction (Boston: Little,~-
Brown, 1945). 
154 f Hayek, Road to Ser dom, pp. 17-19. 
155Hayek, Constitution, pp. 222-224. See also John 
Arthur and William H. ShE"w, Justice and Economic Distribu-
~ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 54. 
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First, they must prescribe a stable monetary framework that 
does not leave monetary policy at the mercy of discretionary 
changes aimed at othez:_policy goals. Second, they must find 
.a policy that will protect the poor and unemployable while 
interfering as little as possible with progress under the 
market. 156 
Hayek has grown more concerned and more pessimistic 
in recent years about monetary policy, specifically about 
the prospects for-avoiding inflation. So deep are his feel-
ings here that Hayek is driven to quote John Maynard Keynes 
approvingly, albeit from Keynes' early writing: 
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning 
the existing basis of society than to debauch the 
currency. The process engages all the hidden forces 
of economic law on the side of destruction, and does 
it in a manner whicg7not one man in a million is able to diagnose, ••• 1 
Unlike other social evils, inflation is not immediately re-
cognized as being harmful--for many years, people may mis-
interpret inflation as growing prosperity. Even after the 
illusory nature of this "prosperity" becomes evident, the 
trademill logic of inflation generally directs popular 
opinion and the government towards trying to get ahead 
156 Hayek, Individualism, p. 112. 
157Hay.ek, New Studies, p. 200, citing John Maynard 
Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), re-
P~inted in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes 
(Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1971), vol. II, 
p. 149. 
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of inflation, which is to say, accelerating inflation. 158 
Hayek does offer a solution to the problem of infla-
tion, although it is like his restructuring of democracy, 
'heuristic rather than pblit~cally plausible. Hayek's pro-
posal is that governments legalize the internal use of 
foreign currency. As matters stand, each nation's treasury 
faces a captive market, and therefore lacks any incentive to 
protect the value of its "product." But if Americans, say, 
could transact business with one another in francs and 
pounds as well as dollars, there would be a powerful incen-
tive for the American Federal Reserve System to preserve 
the value of the dollar--that is, to stop inflation. The 
alternative is the same that faces any other enterprise 
producing an uncompet.i ti ve product--dissolution. According 
to Hayek, if international borders become irrelevant to 
monetary systems, Gresham's Law will be reversed. No longer 
will bad money drive out the good, as is the case if and 
only if the bad money is tied to the good at a fixed rate 
of exchange. With various currencies free to change value 
vis-a-vis one another, well-regulated currencies will drive 
t . h . .d . d" . . t 1 159 ou t e ones 1ssue 1n 1scr1m1na e y. 
158Hayek, Studies, pp. 296-297. 
15~Hayek, New Studies, pp. 225-227. 
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A more durable source of controversy is the extent 
to which pure capitalism should be supplemented by govern-
ment aid to the poor. __ Unlike standardizing weights and 
.measures or protecting the value of the currency, providing 
for the poor necessarily entails departures from the spon-
taneous order. We are no longer merely facilitating economic 
exchanges among citizens, but using the power of the govern-
ment to see that particular economic results are attained. 
Based on Hayek's elaborate case for the spontaneous 
order, we would expect that he would be extremely reluctant 
to accept any government involvement in the allocation of 
wealth. Yet he expresses his skepticism about the preser-
va tion of :gure capital ism: "The term 'laissez fa ire' is a 
highly ambiguous and misleading description of the principles 
on which a [pro-market] policy is based."16° For the govern-
ment provision of certain services Hayek displays a remark-
able enthusiasm. He finds the case for using the govern-
ment's power of taxation to fund services not provided by 
the market "unquestionable;" there is "an overwhelming case" 
for the governemnt to exe_rcise these powers; nor "can it be-
seriously questioned" that goods enjoyed by all should be 
. 161 paid for collectively. Indeed, Hayek seems disposed to 
160 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 81. 
161Hayek, Political Order, pp. 41-42. 
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accept every goal of the modern welfare state--aid to the 
poor and disabled, social insurance, education, and subsi-
dizing certain developments. Only because he has serious 
·objection to the method by which these goals have been pur-
sued in the past, can we refrain from labeling Hayek a 
. 1 d t 162 soc1a emocra • 
What is the basis for Hayek's support for the goals 
of the welfare state, and how does he reconcile such pur-
suits to the spontaneous order?. We may begin by noting that 
there is no overriding imperative leading Hayek to accept 
government programs for the poor comparable to the concern 
for progress that underlays his whole case for the free 
market. Hayek promotes various welfare state measures for 
a variety of causes, according to the spontaneous order's 
inability to guarantee a needed measure of equity or 
security. One reason Hayek offers for favoring programs 
for the relief of poverty is that it is a way that the rest 
of society can protect itself from violent actions by 
163 desparate people. This is not a morally attractive argu-
ment. After extensive l~oting in New York City in 1977, 
U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young suggested that the looting was 
162
uayek, Constitution, pp. 257-258. 
163 Ibid~, pp. 285, 286. 
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justified by the poverty of the people who engaged in it. 164 
If this view is correct, then Hayek's argument must be 
altered to say that wawill assuage poverty not to prevent 
·violence but to prevent jUStified violence. Social relief 
becomes a moral rather than a practical necessity. If the 
poor are not justified in using force to relieve their 
poverty, then the government "program" called for should be 
the prevention of force by arresting citizens who violate 
others' property ·rights. Hayek does not express an opinion 
on the justice of looting by the poor, and his silence on 
this question, along with what he does say about the need 
to help the poor, leaves the impression that he embraces a 
brutally pragmatic view of the relation between the poor and 
the self-sufficient: Those who are not poor have no obli-
gation to help those who are, but are advised to do so for 
their own safety. As a practical matter, they should seek 
to spend the minimum amount necessary, whether in police 
protection or .social relief, to pacify the poor. The poor 
have no right to a minimum standard of living, but possess 
the capacity to intimida~e the rest of society. As a prac-
tical matter, they should use it to increase the liklihood 
of receiving the most generous welfare payments possible, 
and reduce the chances of police restriction. If this is 
164aeorge F. Will, The Pursuit of Happiness and Other 
Sobering Thoughts (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 212. 
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the true meaning of this particular tenet of Hayek's sup-
porting welfare measures, it is deplorable. If it is not 
the true meaning, Raye~ needs to elaborate this argument 
.to prevent grave misinterpretations. 
Hayek offers a second reason why government should 
not be confined to laissez-faire. Some economic goods and 
costs have neighborhood effects on people not party to any 
transactions. If the owner of the vacant lot across the 
street from myhouse decides to sell his property to someone 
who will turn it into an auto junkyard, then I have suffered 
a cost, in the enjoyment of my house, in my ability to sell 
it, and in the price I will receive if I do sell it. Hayek 
regards a spillover effect of this nature as a sufficient 
reason for government intervention. He would have, in this 
instance, a town planning commission assess the junkyard 
owner a surtax to reflect the cost to the neighbors of his 
enterprise, thereby causing the cost of his business to 
accurately reflect all its consequences, on his customers 
165 
as well as on bystanders. 
A related argument for giving the government more 
than minimal powers is the practical necessity of relying 
on the government to finance "public goods." The benefits 
165Hayek, Constitution, pp. 349-353. 
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of certain goods, like city streets, cannot feasibly be 
apportioned among those who use them. Voluntary contribu-
tions for their construction and upkeep won't work either, 
because while everyone might be willing to pay, no one wants 
to be taken advantage of by people who will use the streets 
without paying for them. So the only practical way of get-
ting something everybody wants and is willing to pay for is 
to have the government require payment through taxation. 166 
To some extent, the alleviation of poverty is amenable to 
the same argument; all things being equal, people would pre-
fer to live in a society with less poverty rather than more. 
Individualcontributions to the poor have a negligible 
effect, but a tax-supported program to aid the poor has the 
167 desired consequences. 
The fourth reason Hayek gives for a relatively high 
government profile is closely related to the nature of the 
Open Society. According to Hayek, we cannot really say 
that the emergence of the Open Society is a good thing. 
"The question whether, if we had to stop at our present 
stage of development, we,would be in any significant sense 
better off or happier than if we had stopped a hundred or 
166Hayek, Political Order, p. 44. 
167samuel Brittan, "Hayek, the New Right, and the 
Crisis of.Social Demcoracy," Encounter 54 (January 1980): 35. 
88 
a thousand years ago is probably unanswerable."168 The 
development of the Open Society is beyond morality, a pro-
found fact we must make the best of. However, the transi-
tion to it is not always smooth, and the government may 
need to take actions that facilitate adjustment to the new 
way of life. Because the guarantee of economic security 
provided by extended families, tribes, or villa.ges, is lack-
ing from the Open Society, government will have to compen-
sate for the absence of some of the most basic effects of 
that cohesion. As Hayek states: 
A system which aims at tempting large numbers to 
leave the relative security which the membership in 
the small group has given would probably-soon produce 
great discontent and violent reaction when those who 
have first enjoyed its benefits find themselves with-
out help when, through no fault of their own, their 
capacity to earn a living,ceases.l69 
Hayek's argument for the governmen~ provision of 
elementary education relies on several of these claims. Edu-
cation is a means of transmitting cultural values as well as 
knowledge. In modern society diversity among people may be 
so great that a common culture is not spontaneously trans-
-
mitted. To prevent slow dissolution of society, the govern-
ment may rightfully act to instill the rudiments of ·a com-
mon outlook in young people. Education is also a public 
168Hayek, Constitution, p. 41. 
169Hayek, Political Order, p. 55. 
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good, in the sense that we want to live in a society where 
people are literate rather than illiterate, and the only 
way to guarantee universal education is through public 
financing. 170 
One could presumably list other areas where modern 
governments are now active of which Hayek would approve. 
But the basic point that Hayek favors government involvement 
in a number of areas is sufficiently clear. Hayek himself 
catalogs the sort of government undertakings he favors, not 
because these projects are without other advocates, but to 
separate himself from those to his right, that is, from 
those who insist on a smaller role for government. Given 
Hayek's audience, and his view of the political tendencies 
of the age, his more important t:ask is to distance himself 
from those on his left, which he does by insisting on a dif-
ferent view of the appropriate means for the attainment of 
commonly desired ends. The existing welfare state needlessly 
circumvents the spontaneous order, Hayek feels. Its legi-
timate goals could be accomplished without government actions 
on behalf of every person and group in society. Part of the 
problem is the failure to distinguish the alleviation of 
poverty from the redistribution of income for the satisfac-
tion of egalitarian sentiments. "The doctrine of the safety 
170Hayek, Constitution, p. 377. 
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net, to catch those who fall, has been made meaningless by 
the doctrine of fair shares for those of us who are quite 
able to Stand. rr 171 H k id th ff t t . d -~ye cons ·ers e e or o prov1 e 
certain kinds of assistance to all, even to those able to 
take care of themselves, in order to avoid making the poor 
feel inferior or isolated, similarly excessive, "absurd."172 
Finally, a modern prosperous society can offer two types of 
economic security, a minimum standard of living or the pre-
servation of a person's accustomed standard of living. 
According to Hayek, efforts that start out for the first 
destination always seem to gravitate towards the second. 173 
An .even worse problem than the tendency of the wel-
fare state to overflow its banks is the stifling effect it 
has on experimental forms of production and consumption that 
are essential to progress. Hayek states: 
If,: _instead of administering limited. resources put 
under its control for a specific service, govern-
ment uses its coercive powers to insure that men are 
given what some expert thinks they need; if people 
thus can no longer exercise any choice.in some of 
the most important matters of their lives, such as 
health, employment, housing, and provision for old 
age, but must accept the decisions made for them by 
appointed authority on the basis of its evaluation 
of. their need; if certain services become the exclu-
sive domain of the state, and whole professions--be 
it medicine, education, or insurance--come to exist 
171Ibid., p. 285. 
172Ibid., p. 303. 
173 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, pp. 119-133. 
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only as unitary bureaucratic hierarchies, it will 
no longer be competitive experimentation but solely 
the decisions of authority that will determine what 
men shall get.l74 
In every nation that adopted it, Hayek writes, social 
sec~rity went beyond requiring people to prepare for their 
future needs and providing for the care for the very poor 
to a unitary, comprehensive government system of taxation 
and disbursements. While such a system may be superior in 
the short-run by virtue of economies of scale, as competing 
arrangements for income security are wiped away, beneficial 
innovations are destroyed. The single system becomes in-
creasingly convoluted as it changes to meet new contin-
gencies. Eventually, only the top administrators of the 
program can understand it at all. One of the results is 
that it can then be truly said that "every knowledgeable 
expert" favors the existing program, and would like to see 
it receive more funding. 175 Hayek insists that the goals of 
the welfare stat~ could have been provided for within the 
framework of the Rule of Law, but this would have required 
a long experimental process with a much larger role for 
private arrangements than is anywhere the case today. 176 
174 Hayek, Constitution, p. 261. 
175Ibid., pp. 287-291. 
1'76 Hayek, New Studies, p. 145. 
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Hayek feels that there are other ways to prevent the 
welfare state from unnecessarily impinging on the spontane-
ous order. Hayek is ~ot opposed to regulations to protect 
the environment, health standards, worker safe·ty, or other 
concerns. But he wants them to be formulated and applied 
carefully to make sure that the benefits are greater than 
the costs. 177 Hayek also favors delegating service func-
tions to local government as much as possible. By doing so 
we would engender healthy competition among local govern-
ments to provide the highest level of government protection 
of the quality of life for the lowest cost. 178 Federalism 
could also revive communication sentiments. The Open Society 
is an abstract order, but local communities are bound 
together by particular customs and habits. If welfare 
state functions were delegated to these communities, civic 
concern and pride would increase.179 
While Hayek has said that political philosophers 
should regard their efforts with concern if they find their 
ideas very popular, it is apparently the case that political 
philosophers should also be concerned if their ideas are 
universally dismissed as irrelevant anachronisms. Hayek 
177Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 37. 
178Hayek, New Studies, p. 162. 
179Hayek, Political Order, pp. 146-147. 
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could have carried the principle of nurturing the spon-
taneous order to its logical conclusion, insisting that 
any government effort~ to secure a particular economic 
result was, like the progressive income tax, dangerous in 
itself, and worse as a precedent for future government 
policy. Had he done so his ideas would hav~ instantly won 
the contempt of all those who regard as scandalous the co-
existence in a society of vast wealth and vast poverty. 
Hayek's undogmatic words on behalf of the concerns, if not 
the procedures, of the welfare state do gain him a hearing 
for his central concerns among some of those who might 
otherwise dismiss him as a reactionary. 180 
But it would appear that Hayek ought to be concerned 
about even the limited degree of respectability his ideas 
have attained among those who look askance at the market. 
To these people, who have particular goals they want the 
government to realize in society, Hayek's message seems to 
be an admonition·to pursue these goals cautiously by mini-
mizing the extent to which the government goes beyond the 
Rule of Law. In other words, while Hayek rejects teleo-
cracy in favor of nomocracy, he realizes the teleocratic 
orientation of many of his contemporaries, and urges them 
180L . OWl., End of Liberalism, p. 300. 
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to try to confine themselves to nomocratic means to their 
teloi. In doing so he appears to have vitiated a central 
concern of his theory, the restriction of the government's 
activity. If the Rule of Law can be adapted to certain 
departures from nomocracy, it is not clear that we should 
draw the line between appropriate and inappropriate govern-
ment activities where Hayek does. 181 
It would seem that in making peripheral concessions 
to his critics, Hayek has placed his entire project in 
jeaprody. He has retreated from the bold but iconoclastic 
position that the salvation of modern society lies in dis-
carding all anthropomorphic views of social goals. Instead, 
the realization of his ideals now rests on the hope that 
procedureal restraints on the spontaneous order will be 
sufficient to keep teleocratic incursions on it to a mini-
mum. It is far from clear that the procedural requirements 
of the Rule of Law are adequate to the task. If Hayek is 
quite prepared to acquiesce in the teleocratic orientation 
of others, then it may be that they could be clever enough 
to gain all their goals while following Hayek's guidelines· 
181
navid Micklejohn, review of vols. 1 and 2 of 
Law Legislation, and Liberty, in Ethics 88 (January 1978): 
l81. 
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on how to write laws. 182 This state of affairs would be a 
hollow victory for the s-pontaneous order. More threateningly, 
it seems highly improb~ble that Hayek's procedureal stric-
tures are going to be embraced or preserved by men who do 
not share his view of society's capacity to order itself 
spontaneously. If Hayek fails to win assent ~n this larger 
substantive point, the effort to secure the Rule of Law is 
reduced to the status of a wish. 
182J.W.N. Watkins, "Philosophy," in Agenda for a Free 
Society: Essays on Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty" ed. 
Arthur Seldon (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), pp. 38-40. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
AN ASSESSMENT OF HAYEK 
We have now covered the most important elements of 
Hayek's political philosophy. He has confronted charges 
that the capitalist distribution of income is immoral by 
insisting that we judge capitalism in terms of the available 
alternatives, rather than by an absolute ideal. The alter-
natives to capitalism all require government intervention 
in the economy, Hayek argues, and government cannot possibly 
coordinate the simultaneous pursuit of diverse goals by 
millions of individuals with the speed or precision of the 
market. Further, Hayek claims that the historical pattern 
of government intervention in the economy bas consistently 
compromised the Rule of Law; by depriving citizens of a 
legal order that is known, stable, certain, and equal, govern-
ment intervention has imperiled liberty and made it very 
difficult for private citizens to formulate coherent plans 
for theirom actions. Finally, we have seen that Hayek does 
favor some government steps to intervene in the economy, 
but makes this amendment to the body of his philosophy con-
ditional upon the demonstrated incapacity of the market 
mechanism to perform certain carefully specified functions, 
and insists that the resulting government programs should 
adhere to the Rule of Law as closely as possible. 
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Our remaining tasks are two. This Chapter will be 
concerned with the first, an assessment of the strengths and 
. weaknesses of Hayek's defense of the free market. In Chapter 
Six we will undertake the second, putting forward certain 
amendments to Hayek's philosophy with the intention of 
strengthening his defense of the market. 
We will begin by considering the strengths of Hayek's 
defense of capitalism. Hayek is very effective in explaining 
why capitalist economies are so productive. His demonstra-
tion focuses on the flexibility of the market economy, and 
he argues effectively that capitalism has an invaluable 
ability to reconcile consumers' and producers' desires and 
abilities. His argument makes the point that capitalism can 
prevent economic stagnation by creating a network of incen-
tives. and opportunities for experimentation, and by providing 
through the market a "feedback channel" for showing which ex-
periments have succeeded in satisfying other people's desires. 
Only through ~uch ongoing innovation can we encourage popular 
and beneficial experiments while frustrating the growth of 
. 1 . lt. 183 use ess nove 1es. 
The obverse of this argument, that government direc-
tion of the economy will seriously diminish productivity, is 
183w tk' a 1ns, p. 35. 
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equally compelling in Hayek's hands. Because the operation 
of the market is so swift and subtle, because its consequences 
are so difficult to anticipate, even the most earnest and 
noble government steps are certain to snare the market's pro-
cesses and devitalize the economy. With his economist's 
ability to trace long chains of cause and effect, Hayek suc-
ceeds in showing that the harmful effects of government inter-
vention are more profound than generally realized. The 
factory that is not built because of high taxes, the jobs 
that are not created, the entrepreneurial idea not pursued 
beqause of regulatory obstacles--Hayek is able to convey the 
tangibility of these losses, and thereby show the dimensions 
of the government's ability to damage the economy. 
A second strength of Hayek's defense of capitalism 
is that his political analysis of the problems of government 
intervention in the economy is as persuasive as his discus-
sion of the econndc consequences. Hayek shows that govern-
ment programs alter the political environment, creating new 
interests and expectations. As a consequence, the possibility 
of government interventio~ of limited scope or duration is 
very small; the incentives all favor continued and expanded 
government activity. Milton Friedman has cleverly para-
phrased Adam Smith regarding the disappointemnts of good 
intentions: "An individual who intends only to serve the 
public interest is 'led by an invisible hand to promote' 
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private interests, which was no part of his intention.•"184 
Hayek concludes flatly that the nearly inevitable result of 
even the noblest government programs is "the protection of 
certain groups against the necessity to descend from the 
absolute or relative material position which they have for 
some time enjoyed."185 
Hayek's development of the theory of the Rule of Law 
is an impressive achievement in itself, but it is also an 
effective antidote to this very problem, the tendency of 
modern politics to degenerate into the accumulation of sub-
sidies and advantages. The Rule of Law provides an exacting 
procedura.l · .. standard for judging, resisting, and perhaps 
arresting this disturbing trend. Hayek would concur with 
the cautious wisdom of Oakeshott: 
An "umpire" who at the same time is one of the players 
is no umpire; "rules" about which we are not disposed 
to be conservative are not rules but incitements to 
disorder; the conjunction of dreaming and ruling 
generates tyranny.l86 
The final strength of Hayek's position is his acknow-
ledgment that while the market is good it is not perfect, and 
184F · ~ · F to Ch . 5 6 r1euman, ree oose, pp. - • 
185Hayek, New Studies, pp. 186-
186Ridgely Hill Pate, Russell Kirk, Friedrich Hayek, 
and Peter Viereck: Three Positions in Contemporary Conser-
vative Thought (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at 
Austin), p: 170, citing Michael Oakenshott, Rationalism in 
Politics, p. 194. 
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government intervention, while problem&tic, is not doomed 
to failure. Consequent1.y, Hayek argues in f.3.vor of many of 
the goals of the welfare state, suggesting even that his 
main concern is with the way government pursues social 
policy, rather than the pursuit itself. Hayek's amending 
his theories on this point may be a tactical concession. He 
says that the market's defenders must come.to grips with the 
moral environment of the day, which calls for more economic 
. . 187 
equality and security than capitalism is likely to prov1de. 
But even Hayek's pragmatism is commendable here, I think, if 
only for leavening what could otherwise be a narrow, dogma-
tic reliance on the procedures of good law. 
We turn now to the examination of the weaknesses of 
Hayek's treatment of the question~of the common good, second, 
his attitude towards certain self-destructive tendencies of 
capitalism, and third, Hayek's moral relativism. Regarding 
the common good, we note that Hayek has a purely additive 
conception of it. That is, the only conception of the com-
mon good Hayek will accept is the sum of pri~ate interests. 188 
187Hayek, Individualism, p. 109. 
188Hayek, Mirage, pp. 1-5. 
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The spontaneous order makes the greatest contributions "for 
everyone a.nd therefore for the general welfare."189 Hayek's 
common good is little more than a play on words; it denies 
the possibility of the common-ness of any good, of communal 
or social benefits. The additive common good is, for all 
practical purposes, the same as prosperity, and prosperity, 
as Irving Kristol has pointed out, is too· weak an ideal to 
maintain popular allegiance to a social or economic system.l90 
When Hayek.does consider a more encompassing notion 
of the common good, one that calls for civic unity as re-
gards certain pursuits, Hayek unfailingly reduces this common 
good to a straw man. He derides an egalitarian who has termed 
the goal of politics "as the removal of all sources of dis-
. 191 
content." This is, of course, a fatuous position. But 
Hayek insists on treating it as the representative expres-
sion of the idea of the common good. He refuses to accept 
the idea that one can articulate certain general goals for a 
society without getting enmeshed in the determination of 
every facet of life. "All attempts to model the Great 
Society on the image of the familiar group, or to turn it 
into a community by directing the individual towards· common 
189Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 132-133. 
190 . Kristol, Capitalism, p. 191. 
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visible purposes, must produce a totalitarian society."192 
It is one thing to say that there is a tendency for the 
growth of government to perpetuate itself, quite another to 
· assert that reasonable men cannot define and pursue common 
goals in such a way that individual liberties are 
193 
respected. 
Hayek's misperception of the nature of the common 
good is accompanied by a misperception of the desire for 
it. Arthur Seldon describes such desires succinctly: 
The risks and sanctions of the market process must 
receive the moral allegiance of the people. The 
market must be seen not only as efficient but as 
good and satisfying ~~atever canons of justice are reg~rded as proper.l 
But Hayek denies that we can apply any canons of justice 
to society, or even that we can gradually approach the com-
mon good by eliminating those social evils widely regarded 
195 
as abhorrent. The decent conviction that a good society 
cannot abide certain grevious ills is thus pushed aside. 
For all his acumen in discussing the workings of capitalism 
l92Hayek, Mirage, p. 147. (Emphasis mine.) 
193
see E. F. M. Durbin, "Professor Hayek on Ec·onomic 
· Planning and Political Liberty," Economic Journal 55 
(December 1945): 360-365. 
·l9~eldon, Introduction, in Seldon, pp. 11-12. 
195H k M. aye , 1rage, p. 78. 
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and the consequences of circumscribing it, Hayek seems in-
capable of that quality of imagination that would allow him 
to understand the attraction of interfering in the market to 
. 196 ~orrect severe problems. 
Not only is Hayek's treatment of the common good, 
confused and perhaps unfair, a problem in itself, but it 
causes serious difficulties for the whole of his defense 
of capitalism. Having agreed tnat the market's defenders 
must accept the widespread desire for government programs 
that alter the market's results, Hayek has embraced the goals, 
if not the means, of the modern welfare state. Having made 
this concession Hayek tries to preserve the market order by 
calling for government intervention to accord with the Rule 
of Law as much as possible. But ijayek has no framework for 
telling us how much adherence to the Rule of Law is possible. 
In the absence of any conception of the common good, which 
could be used to weigh trade-offs among equality, 
efficiency, and liberty, Hayek provides no criteria for 
making policy decisions. One can thus expect that the 
political realization of Hayek's philosophy will not affect 
the modern welfare state all that much. Someone must decide 
to what extent following the Rule of Law is possible, and 
196Ronald Max Hartwell, "Capitalism and the Historians," 
in Machlup, p. 92. 
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since Hayek does not tell us, the decision seems likely to 
rest with those who currently administer the welfare state, 
and who have at least a- clear picture of their goals, if not 
the procedural strictures they ought to serve. 
Hayek's explanations of why certain welfare state 
programs will not endanger liberty and progress ring false 
due to the lack of any comprehe?sive framework for consider-
ing social policy. It would be more reasonable to say that 
sacrificing a measure of the freedom necessary for the 
spontaneous order to obtain a measure of security or equality 
is a good bargain than to pretend, as Hayek seems to do, that 
the right kind of welfare state does not diminish liberty. 
But Hayek absolutely cannot take a balancing approach because 
I 
I 
it makes progress a value comparable to others, all of which 
reasonable people can assess and weigh; progress remains an 
absolute value, beyond criticism because its future course 
. . 197 ~n unknown. So while Hayek clearly favors government 
activity beyond the night watchman state, it is unclear how 
much farther he is willing to go. The unyielding position 
of Milton Friedman or Robert Nozick seems, by comparison, 
much more lucid. 198 So, Hayek's efforts to promote capitalism 
. 
197Philip w. Dwyer and R. Harrison Hickman, "American 
Conservatism and F.A. Hayek," Modern Age 23 (Fall 1979): 387. 
198wilhelm, pp. 180-181. 
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while accomodating the moral resistance to it appear stymied 
by the absence of any device in Hayek's thought for mediat-
ing the two aims. 
A second area in which Hayek's defense of the market 
is inadequate is his treatment of the self-destructive ten-
dencies of capitalism. Hyperactive government may well be 
the greatest threat to the free market. But if certain 
trends within capitalism could destroy it from within, wise 
government policies may be the only way to secure the future 
of the market. Just such a trend is the reduction of com-
petitors by attrition, until enormous corporations control 
vast sections of many markets. In capital-intensive indus-
tries, like steel and automobiles, the costs of an initial 
investment are so great that the threat from new corpora-
tions is nil, while retooling costs might be so high that 
smaller firms have great trouble staving off the giants. 
Even in less capital-intensive sectors, such as the service 
industries, large firms can amass marketing and research 
teams with formidable expertise. Clearly, it is possible 
for capitalism to winnow ,out the great majority of capi-
talists, and in the process to all but eliminate the com-
petition and experimentation that justifies capitalism. 
Hayek never deals fully with this problem. He seems 
determined to focus solely on the government threat to the 
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to the market. So he states, but does not really argue, 
that government is the chief cause of monopoly, as a result 
of tariffs, patents, and laws governing corporations. 199 He 
·insists, notwithstanding fears to the contrary, that cor-
porate giantism is not inimical to competition, and the 
potential of such firms to wield unacceptable economic and 
social power is exaggerated. 200 Hayek may be right; there 
is an argument to be made that in the long run government 
regulation of monopoly is ineffective. But on an issue of 
this importance, about which so many people have misgivings, 
Hayek really should provide more guidance. 
There is a second respect in which capitalism poses 
a threat to its own survival. This is the tendency of the 
experience of life under modern ciapitalism to lead people 
to develop attitudes that are inimical to the existence 
of capitalism. To his credit, Hayek acknowledges the 
problem. He points out that modern capitalism is charac-
terized by the existence of many large corporations with 
thousands of employees. People who view society from the 
perspective of an employ~e are unlikely to appreciate the 
importance of individual entrepreneurs. They will be 
199Hayek, New Studies, p. 146. 
200Hayek, Political Order, pp. 79-80. 
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receptive to political programs that enhance employees' 
security, while being unconcerned about taxes and regulations 
that stifle small businesses. Hayek laments the tendency to 
~hink of society in terms of one large organization rather 
than diverse competing ones. But he confines his remedy to 
a reiteration of the continuing importance of-the entre-
preneurial pathfinder, a solution of much narrower scope 
201 than the problem. 
Indeed, others have examined this same area and found 
the problems of the attitudes nurtured by capitalism to be 
even more serious that Hayek imagines. Daniel Bell has 
argued that capitalism, especially in America, is beset by 
a hug€?, "cultural contradiction." The "production ethic" 
calls for diligence, sobriety, an~ frugality, while the 
modern "consumption ethic" urges instant gratification, com-
fort, leisure, and self-indulgence. "One is to be 'straight' 
by day and a 'swinger' by night."202 The resulting frustra-
tion and confusion is most severe. Equally frustrating and 
contradictory is the growing importance attached to "posi-
tional goods." A robust market economy may provide virtuall-Y 
201Hayek, Constitution, pp. 118-130; and Hayek Mirage, 
pp. 134-135. 
202
naniel Bell~ The Cultural Contradictions of Capi-
talism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 71-72, 84. 
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everyone with a good education and a comfortable home, but 
is cannot possibly give more than a few schooling at an 
"elite" institution, or a house in one of the "best" neighbor-
hoods. As capitalism has succeeded in satisfying mass demands 
for mass-produced consumption items, the focus of the up-
wardly mobile has turned towards positional goods that are 
intrinsically limited. The discovery of such limits has 
come as a shock to those who took capital ism • s promise to be 
an ever-improving standard of li~ing. 203 Having already 
indicated the importance of adjusting the case for capitalism 
to account for the moral sentiments of the time, Hayek (and 
his followers) need to take these newer attitudes under 
serious consideration. Further, he needs to construct 
a defense of capitalism that is compelling enough that those 
who live in a market economy can see it virtues despite the 
vicissitudes of daily lfie. 
The third area in which Hayek's political philosophy 
is vulnerable is its moral relativism. Hayek writes: 
But the gravest deficiency of the older prohpets 
[such as Moses] was their.belief that the intui-
tively perceived ethical values, divined out of the 
depth of man's breast, were immutable and eternal. 
This prevented them from recognizing that a11· rules 
of conduct served a particular kind of order to 
soc~ety, and that, though such a society will find it 
203K . t 1 r1.s o , pp. 32-37. See also; Will, pp. 97-99. 
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necessary to enforce its rules of conduct in order 
to protect itself.against di$ruption, it is not 
society with a given structure that creates the rules 
appropriate to it, but the rules which have been prac-
tised by a few ~nd then imitated by many which created 
a social order of a particular kind. Tradition is 
not something constant:but the product of a process of 
selection guided not by reason but by success. It 
changes but can rarely be deliberately changed. Cul-
tural selection is not a rational process; it is not 
guided by but it creates reason.20~ -
Hayek does qualify tis idea of historical change in 
a way that staves off utter relativism. He insists that 
since reason is a creature of history it is impossible for 
reason to rise above history and pretend to apprehend stan-
dards by which to criticize tradition. 205 Accordingly, 
Hayek rejects the claims of the discovery of the meaning of 
history by Hegel, Marx, or Comte. 206 And he cautions that 
the supposition that we can think our way out of traditional 
moral restraints is a conceit that harbors terrible savagery; 
civilization requires acceptance of the products of the 
evolution of morals. 207 
But however cautious a relativist he may be, Hayek 
still denies that there is any fixed point in the mora~ 
20~Hayek, Political Order, p. 166. 
205 Hayek, New Studies, p. 20. 
206 Rules and Order, 23-24. Hayek, pp. 
207 Hayek, Political Order, p. 174. 
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universe, or any evil that time and progress may not render 
good. This posture is. intrinsically objectionable for 
several reasons. Fir~t, despite his protestations about 
. respect for tradition, Hayek finds himself denigrating the 
moral foundations of the West. H.B. Acton agrees that some 
mores will evolve in response to circumstances, but says 
that it is almost nihilistic for Hayek to claim that all 
moral precepts, even the decalogue or the Golden Rule, are· 
subject to the same erosion. 208 David Lewis Schaefer scoffs 
at the idea that the moral teachings of Moses, Plato, or 
Rousseau have been rendered obsolete because of their fail-
ure to appreciate "the contribution that the market economy 
makes to the ad~ancement of ci~ilization." 209 
Hayek's deliberate dissociation from t"he traditional 
understanding of morality (as distinguished from precepts 
of traditional morality) leaves him incapable, apparently, 
of understanding the moral earnestness of the opposition to 
capitalism. ~ayek can attribute the widespread revulsion 
for materialism to "socialist teaching." 210 And he claims 
.
208H.B. Acton, "Objectives," in Seldon, pp. 77-78~ 
209na~id Lewis Schaefer, review of The Political Order 
of a Free People, American Political Science Review 74 (March 
1980): 166. 
210Hayek," Road to Serfdom, p. 130. 
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that the "civilizing forces of commerce," which promote 
such virtues as kindness and "consideration of the weak 
- 211 
and infirm," have been overlooked. Hayek ought to have 
.considered more seriously the possibility of a deeper basis 
for the aversion to capitalism, or that consideration of 
the weak might issue in efforts to enlist the government 
in their protection. 
A second respect in which Hayek's teaching about 
history and our relation to it is internally flawed is his 
inability to make clear to what extent history is beyond 
deliberate human cqntrol. Hayek seems to waver, sometimes 
rejecting the "fatalistic" belief that you can't turn back 
the clock, sometimes expressing doubts that the trend to-
d . 1' . 'bl 212 war s soc1a 1sm 1s revers1 e. , Barbara Wooton has 
. ' 
pointed out the anomaly of Hayek's devoting a chapter of 
The Road to Serfdom to "Why the Worst Get on Top," since 
the thesis of that book seems to be that planning is hor-
. 213 
rific no matter who gets on top. 
Thirdly, Hayek's notion of historical evolution seems 
at variance with much of what we know about history. 
211Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
212 Seldon, p. 11; See Hayek, Constitution, pp. 284, 304. 
213 Wooton, Freedom, footnote, p. 37. 
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According to Hayek, "The growth of what we call civilization 
is due to this principle of a person's responsibility for 
his actions and their ~onsequences, and the freedom to pursue 
his own ends without having to obey the leader of the band 
to which he belongs."214 Individual freedom certainly ex-
plains in part the growth of civilization. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that absolute monarchy, or voo doo, or 
trial by torture declined as principles of social organiza-
tion because they were practiced by groups who gradually 
gave way to groups not organized along these lines. 215 Nor 
is it fair for Hayek to portray capitalism as spontaneously 
emergent while attributing anti-capitalist sentiments to the 
manipulations of intellectuals. Milton Fisk argues that 
many reform movements or revolutions flare up in history as 
if by spontaneous combustion, while capitalism has often been 
propped up by deliberately chosen policies. 216 Hayek clearly 
seems to have mistaken an aspect of the process of historical 
change for the whole of it. 
214nayek, New Studies, p. 299. 
215Jacob Viner, "Hayek on Freedom and Coercion," 
Southern Economic Journal 27 (January 1961): 235 • 
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216Milton Fisk, review of Rules and Order, Philosophi-
cal ·Review 85 (July 1976): 429-432. 
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Apart from these inherent difficulties of Hayek's 
relativism, showing careless scholarship or implausible 
moral reasoning, Hayek's relativism is destructive of his 
larger attempt at defending capitalism. It is so in the 
general sense in which any thinker's relativism tends to cut 
the ground from under him, trivializing any points he is 
trying to advance. For example, by arguing that longevity 
bestows legitimacy on institutions, Hayek leaves his theory 
vulnerable to being used to justify egalitarianism. If 
Hayek's ideal is progress attained through unplanned experi-
mentation, he would seem to be defending most of the welfare 
state as currently administered, which has, by now, a long 
history of incremental adaptation. 217 Hayek has compromised 
his own ability to criticize egalitarianism or advocate 
capitalism. 
More specifically, Hayek's relativism limits his 
ability to put forward a moral defense of the market. Hayek 
understands the need for such a defense of the market clearly 
enough. He points out that the benefits of government inter-
vention are usually far more tangible than its costs, and 
the shortcomings of capitalism are generally more visible 
217Eugene F. Miller, "Hayek's Critique of Reason," 
Modern Age 20 (Fall 1976): 392-393; Samuel Brittan, "Hayek, 
the New Right, and the Crisis of Social Democracy," Encounter 
54 (January 1980): 33-35. 
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than its virtues. If capitalism is defended on the basis of 
its results, Hayek concludes, it will lose every time, be-
cause these results are so difficult to perceive. Therefore, 
Hayek insists that the only effective defense of capitalism 
must be in terms of principle. Only by conveying the im-
portance of principles such as the protected sphere for 
individual liberty can the market win the allegiance of the 
218 people. But of course, those thoroughly familiar with 
Hayek's philosophy will realize that the principles that he 
appeals to are products of a certain type of civilization, 
and constantly subject to revision. They will be accepted 
as a sufficient defense of the market only by those who do 
not know, as Hayek's followers do, that progress is the 
essence of civilization, and no moral principle is immune 
to progress. Hayek is, in effect, calling for a principled 
defense of a system whose leading feature, according to him, 
is that it is unfettered by any immutable and eternal 
ethical principles. 
The charitable interpretation of this anomaly is that 
Hayek is confused. The more plausible explanation is that 
his moral defense of capitalism is Hayek's Noble Lie, the 
218Hayek, Constitution, pp. 67-68; Hayek, Rules and 
· ·order, pp. 56-57. 
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only device for reconciling the multitude to an economic 
system they cannot understand. This effort has paradoxical 
consequences. We have seen that Hayek is tempted to regard 
as artificial what appears to be genuine and spontaneous--
the moral revulsion against the inequalities of capitalism. 
It now seems that he wishes to pass off as genuine moral 
attitudes he himself believes to be confused. This is 
hardly a reassuring start for the moral defense of capital-
ism. It promises a future of ever more elaborate deception, 
trying to deny real sentiments and defend inculcated ones. 
Whether those who engage in such an enterprise are in a 
position to make a moral defense of anything is.an open 
question. 
t 
CHAPTER SIX 
CAPITALISM AND THE COMMON GOOD 
On the basis of our examination in the last chapter we 
may put forward two conclusions. First, Hayek's project--
the justification of the market in terms consonant with 
moral sensibilities of our times--is worth doing. A pros-
perous economy is a prerequisite for rescuing millions from· 
poverty, and there is no substitute for the market mechanism 
in promoting and maintaining prosperity. Furthermore, capi-
talism is so closely related to the Rule of Law that it is 
impossible to follow the latter without substantially pro-
tecting the former. The second conclusion is that Hayek has 
not successfully completed this project. His argument on 
behalf of a modifieq capitalism is neither clear nor con-
vincing; Hayek has not reconciled his defense of the market 
with his acceptance of government alterations of it. Hayek's 
lack, of conviction seems to have worn off on his effort to 
provide a moral justification for capitalism, which is 
especially unpersuasive. 
This chapter will suggest a different approach to the 
construction of a defense of the market. The argument here 
. will rely heavily, though not exclusively, on the political 
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thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel, contained in his books, 
Sovereignty and The Ethics of RedistribUtion. Jouvenel's 
political writings are __ neither so voluniinous nor as systema-
tic as Hayek's; he grants that their purpose is "suggestive 
rather than didactic." 219 But Jouvenel provides an illumi-
nating contrast with Hayek--because their perspectives are 
similar in many ways, the remaining differences are often 
important. 
For example, Jouvenel shares Hayek's fundamental in-
sight about the nature of social organization.. Jouvenel sees 
modern social life as a "web of infinite complexity," far 
more intricate than what Hayek would call face-to-:-face 
society. 22° Consequently, Jouvenel is as dubious as Hayek 
regarding the possibility of social reform based on compre-
hensive knowledge of society. Jouvenel writes: 
[I do] not believe that it is possible even for the 
most powerful intelligence to envisage in advance 
all future possibilities of ••• co~operation, and 
[I] cannot for that reason.take the view that it needs 
to be built up in successive stages from a single 
organising centre. The cause of its enrichment [I 
find] is the unfailing sup~2~ of fresh initiatives 
taken independently; ••• 
219Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into 
the.Political Good, translated by J.F. Huntington (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 295. 
220Ibid., p. 2. 
2211, . d 
01 • ' pp. 10-11. 
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Jouvenel resembles Hayek again when he notes "the 
miracle of society," the fact that the absence of a central 
organizing force does-not render social life chaotic; depen-
dent as we are on the behavior of innumerable strangers, we 
can ·proceed with great confidence that their behavior will 
meet our expectations. 222 Unlike Hayek, however, who attri-
butes this miracle to society's capacity for spontaneous 
order, Jouvenel says that the basis of modern social life 
is the "institutionalization of trust." Society coheres if 
it maintains a common code of behavior and a mutually 
accepted moral outlook. Uncertainity about the feelings, 
thoughts, and actions of others is the source of estrange-
ment in modern life that causes citizens to feel like aliens 
in their own country, and causes social life to crumble. 223 
And unlike Hayek, Jouvenel feels that modern society is 
particularly in need of reassurance and stability regard-
ing these basic qualities. The more rapidly the material 
c.ircumstances of ·life change the more desperately men need 
a durable touchstone for security and confidence. 224 
222Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
223Ibid. 
224 Ib1" d., 104 p. • 
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Because Jouvenel shares Hayek's opinion about the com-
plexity of modern society, he shares some of Hayek's mis-
givings about the pursuit of the common good. "It is not 
the office of the public authority to pursue personal goods 
of individuals," Jouvenel writes; government cannot know what 
these goods are, and cannot pursue them without trampling 
liberty. 225 But because Jouvenel sees a perishable founda-
tion of social life, he takes a position on the common good 
different from Hayek. Jouvenel says that the common good 
will consist in, and require the defense of, certain funda-
mental conditions essential to the continued existence of 
-
society. These include the protection of a nation's terri-
torial integrity, and the preservation of the material and 
moral bases of social life. Jouvenel summarizes these goals 
by saying that the common good of any society is the social 
bond itself. Wise politics is permeated by the knowledge 
of the precariousness of social order, and the need to attend 
constantly to its defense and preser~ation. 226 
Jouvene1's conception of the common good corrects a 
major defect in Hayek's theory. If we think of the mainten: 
ance of the conditions of social life as the overarching 
225
rbid., pp. 109-112. 
226
rbid., pp. 112-114, 123-129. 
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common good, we must break with Hayek in his treatment of 
spontaneously generated progress as an absolute value. 
Jouvenel's common good_~akes the free market a feature of 
the good society, but does not grant pre-eminence to it. In 
our e~forts to preserve our society we will carefully con-
sider the market's contribution to generating-wealth and 
preserving freedom. Society cannot cohere when these quali-
ties are absent or disappearing. But society also needs to 
redress glaring inequalities, and to be able to satisfy it-
self that it has treated its weakest members humanely, and 
these requirements of the common good may necessitate cur-
tailing the free market. The common good, then, provides 
the framework that we need to undertake the modifications of 
capitalism which Hayek, and many others, have called for. 
Reasonable people will disagree about whether particular 
trade-offs promote the common good. But the idea itself 
will focus and guide public policy debates in a way that 
Hayek's incomplete theory cannot. 
It is true, as Hayek and Jouvenel recognize, that 
the common good can be made a pretext for incursions on 
liberty, both petty and terrifying. Perfect reassurance 
cannot be given on this point. But Jouvenel's conception 
of the common good ought to lend itself to the reasonable 
distinction between matters that endanger the social order 
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and those that do not. The common good is no less dependent 
on reasonableness within the political order than other 
conceptual frameworks f~r politics. Hayek's hopes for the 
modification of capitalism are, as we have seen, heavily 
depen.dent on the good sense of the governors. But Jouvenel 
does not allow his political thought to be paralyzed by the 
possibility that his ideas will be abused by unreasonable 
people. So where Jouvenel agrees with Hayek that absolute 
social justice, in a society of modern complexity, is im-
possible, Jouvenel does not go on to say, as Hayek does, 
that the whole idea of social justice is therefore a mirage. 
According to Jouvenel, justice is in one sense "a quality of 
human will." Rather than blandly accepting whatever social 
arrangements emerge as social life develops, we must try to 
see that "the whole ceaseless process of change should be 
increasingly permeated by the quality of social justice in 
. d ... d 1 .11 " 227 our 1n 1v1 ua w1 s. So while there might not be 
social justice, there will be social injustice if we cal-
lously accept any arrangements that, as Hayek would say, 
emerge spontaneously. Th~ victims of this injustice will 
include not only the poor but the whole society as a moral 
entity. 
------~~=-----------227Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
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Hayek 1 s very different stand on the common good is 
based on a political perception that is not only different 
from Jouvenel 1 s, but flawed in a fundamental way. Hayek is 
greatly concerned about the preservation of the abstract 
quality of order. So far is he from a concern for particu-
lar political orders that he states that the culmination of 
politics, in his view, would be the decline of nationalism 
d th f ld . t 228 an e emergence o a wor soc1e y. But Hayek has to 
admit that all human history to date has been in particular, 
"factual" orders, rather than in the experience of the sheer 
abstract quality of order. 229 This acknowledgment undercuts 
his attempts to formulate a purely procedural guide to 
politics, because his procedural strictures will be subject 
to varying applications according to the requirements of 
different political orders. 230 
Jouvenel, by contract, deals directly with the fact 
of different political orders. "To consider groups as 
secondary pheonomena resulting from a synthesis of indi-
viduals is a wrong approach; they should be regarded as 
228Hayek, Studies, pp. 163-164i Hayek, Individualism, 
pp. 28-29. 
229Hayek, Mirage, pp. 56-59. 
230Richard Vernon, The 1 Great Society' and the "open 
Society': Liberalism in Hayek and Popper," Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 9 (June 1976): 265-271. 
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primary phenomena of human existence."231 The origins of 
. 
groups are in authority, and this quality of authority is 
anything but abstract,- says Jouvenel. Authority begins in 
'the "natural ascendency" of certain men, of the sort that 
can be seen to emerge spontaneously in times of emergency, 
such as a fire or accident. 232 This leadership is the 
quality that creates and maintains groups, "the efficient 
cause of voluntary organizations."233 As the organizations 
grow in size and complexity, authority_becomes institu-
tionalized, and the maintenance of existing social orders 
becomes the task of politics. 234 
One upshot of these differences is that Jouvenel's 
political theory is capable of giving a helpful account of 
the fact of occasional political crises that threaten a 
regime's existence while Hayek's philosophy is not benefi-
cial on this point. Hayek's political philosophy is tailored 
for a political order where all great issues have already 
been resolved, and the problem is to preserve and enhance a 
231 Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 56. 
232 Ibid., p. 32. 
233Ibid., pp. 28-31. 
234 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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functioning system. Jouvenel calls the type of authority 
needed here the office of adjustment, and says that it must 
superintend the incremental adjustments necessary to maintain 
'the contours of social life. But Jouvenel speaks of another 
type of authority that has no analogue in Hayek's thought, 
the office of leadership. -Every society periodically con~ 
fronts profound crises that pose imminent dangers to the 
nation. The office of adjustment cannot cope with such a 
challenge, and the office of leadership must confront the 
crisis by organizing a great, vital, public endeavor, such 
as a war or social reformation. These offices are not to 
be understood as formal branches of government, but as 
qualities of the political order itself, a nation's ordinary 
and extraordinary understanding of its own existence. By 
confining himself to the shallows of politics, Hayek is 
unable to appreciate the intensity of the feelings or actions 
that regard the preservation of a venerable way of life. 235 
We conclude this discussion of the common good by 
' . 
saying that it, and Jouvenel·' s position generally, provide 
a centripetal force in political theory, capable of over-
coming the dangerous centrifugal tendencies of Hayek's 
thought. Jouvenel asserts that political science is a moral 
235Ibid., pp. 40-55 •. 
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science. The intercourse of humans in society requires a 
"common stock of beliefs and a similar structure of feelings." 
Men can live in society because they share a "common moral 
language," he says, and if this language breaks apart, society 
W]..ll ·d1"ssolve also. 236 H k f 11 h" b t aye , or a 1s concern a ou 
liberty, does not attach much importance to the inculcation 
of a devotion to liberty among the people or the governors. 
If Hayek is right about people being preoccupied with private 
interests, such a teaching is especially important if liberty 
is to endure. 237 
The common good also appears to remedy the second main 
defect of Hayek's theory, the consideration of the self-de-
structive tendencies of capitalism. Because it provides a 
framework where we can consider trade-offs in the public 
interest, the idea of the common good can structure discus-
sions about anti-trust policy. Again, the common good will 
not be the last word on deciding at what point corporate 
power must be checked by government power. But it can be a 
starting point, framing the discussion in terms of what 
qualities we need from the market in maintaining the material 
foundations of society, so that we can proceed to ascertain 
whether a particular economic structure satisfies or 
236Ibid., pp. 303-304. 
237Wilhelm, p. 181. 
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frustrates that need. Further, by placing the case for 
capitalism in the context of the larger concern for the pre-
servation of the social order, the comm.on good provides a 
'basis for resolving the cultural contradictions of capitalism. 
Rather than considering consumption and production sui 
generis, and tolerating growing dicontinuities between the 
two halves of the economic process, the common good relates 
them both to a larger purpose. In so doing it facilitates 
public and private efforts to adapt the economic processes 
to the common moral language, and to prevent excesses where 
the economy transgresses the collective moral vision. 
The final shortcoming of Hayek's theory is its moral 
relativism, and this is the most difficult to dispute. 
i 
Hayek's position that moral opinions are subjective and 
cannot be legitimately imposed on others is probably the 
facet of his thought most congenial to modern sensibilities. 
Hayek claims to have been influenced by David Hume more 
strongly than by any other philosopher, and Hume's episte-
melogical barriers have certainly kept many people besides 
. 238 Hayek from believing in objective moral standards. . 
From what we have seen of Jouvenel so far, his 
theories may appear ill-suited to a -refutation of moral 
relativism. If the common good is the social bond itself, 
238Hayek, New Studies, p. 264. 
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different societies will require different common goods. In 
light of this, Jouvenel's moral criteria seem to vary as 
much as Hayek's. But this interpretation is at odds with 
the tenor of Jouvenel's thought. I do not understand Jouvenel 
to be saying that the common good is good simply because it 
is common--that the preservation of Naziism is good in the 
context of Nazi Germany. Rather, it seems that the common 
good must indeed be good for Jouvenel, must accord with the 
development of what is best in human nature. Regarding the 
subject of economic policy, for example, Jouvenel insists 
that the good life is not a "buyer's spree," an attitude he 
finds in the arguments of opponents and defenders of capital-
ism. Civil life requ.i:res a correct understanding of the 
limited importance of economics, he says. The purpose of 
economic activity is not the indefinite increase of private 
luxury, "gnawing the income bone," but the facilitation of 
more important goals. Economic activity ought to conduce to 
increasing the·sociability of men, and improving their moral, 
intellectual, and aesthetic character. 239 
It does not appear, then, that Jouvenel's common good 
necessarily leads us into moral relativism. It is not with-
out difficulties, particularly in terms of reconciling 
239 Jo~venel, Ethics, pp. 45-48, 53-55. 
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universal needs of men with the requirements of particular 
nations with particular customs. To attach too much import-
ance to the latter ra~ses the prospect of de facto relati-
.vism, while to insistently stress the former could lead to 
brittle absolutism. The common good is not, to repeat, a 
panacea. But it does provide a basis for the resolution of 
the problem confronted by Hayek, the adjustment of the mar-
ket processes to the prevailing notions of fairness. Hayek's 
cautionary remarks about the consequences of disturbing the 
market order are instructive, but become useful guides only 
within the context of the ongoing effort to promote the good 
life for man within stable political orders. 
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